Sunday, December 7, 2008
Tuesday, November 11, 2008
Working Paper Collective Violence, Religious Freedom and Democratization in Indonesia
Suaedy
By Ahmad Suaedy
It is almost as if democracy and decentralization in Indonesia is irreversible. These processes have thus far continued through the establishment of democratic pillar institutions along side supporting institutions, such as the general elections which have been independently managed by the General Election Commission (KPU), both national elections for parliament and the presidency and also elections for regional heads; the removal of military institutions from national political and economic domination; as well as freedom of the press. All this was impossible to even dream about during the New Order ten years ago.
More important than this is the reassertion of the existence of the Indonesian nation through amendments to the 1945 constitution, which is principally a secular state in that it is based on equality of all citizens in the face of the law without discrimination against religion, skin colour, race, gender or class, and in that it is also based on human rights principles. Thus, constitutionally, Pancasila principles form the philosophical basis of the Indonesian nation, that is, Belief in One Almighty God; Just and Civilized Humanity; the Unity of Indonesia; Democracy Guided by the Wisdom of Representative Deliberation; and Social Justice for all Indonesians. These principles were strengthened, once again, as the democratic foundation of Indonesia at precisely the same time that post-New Order changes began to occur.
However, new challenges have emerged and have the potential to threaten the process of democratization and decentralization. Namely, the strengthening of political identity which has threatened to undermine the foundations of the constitution itself. Since this, various models of violence have emerged, particularly collective violence between groups, based on religion or ethnicity or any other categorization. At the same time, state and government guarantees of religious freedom have been waived due to demands of specific groups, which have involved force and even violence, against other sects. Such groups have thus forced the government to take actions which have restricted religious freedoms. The Joint Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and the Attorney General in June 2008 limited the movements of Ahmadiyah, a Muslim sect, and was indicative of the government’s lack of power in facing demands from groups opposing religious freedom.
Instead of protecting attacked groups from their attackers, the state apparatus has often worsened the victims’ financial situations by physically evacuating them while allowing their attackers to destroy their property. The state apparatus then brings the victims to court on the count of blasphemy. If this tendency is allowed to continue, it is feared that it will plant seeds of discrimination to the point that the government can no longer make any guarantees, and will culminate in demands to alter the constitution. Thus the opposing demands of collective violence and religious freedom can hinder or become a point of reversal to the achievement of democracy in the form of justice and equality of all citizens in the face of the law.
The Basis of Indonesian Democracy: Theory and Practice
The strengthening of the democratic base is reflected in the reassertion of guarantees of equality of all citizens of all groups, as well as the guarantee of human rights through various sections in the constitution. In the 1945 constitution on the topic of human rights section 28 emphasises the guarantee of equality of all citizens and the obligation of the state to protect them, as well as the right of citizens to hold a religion or belief. “Everyone has the right to secure equal opportunity in the government. Everyone has the right to citizenship status.” (verse 28D). In the same section, point E mentions the right to adhere to, carry out, and even propagate a religion. It does not mention specific religions:
Everyone is entitled to the right to profess and practice the religion of his choice, to choose an appropriate education and teaching method, to choose proper employment, to choose nationality, to choose a place of residence within the territory of a State and the right to leave it as well as to return.
Everyone has the right to the freedom of embracing a religion or belief, the right to hold opinions and to act and behave according to one’s conscience.
Everyone has the right to the freedom of association, assembly and expression.
Also, in the same section, point I items 2 and 3 guarantee the absence of discrimination in any form, as well as respect for identity and community traditions:
2. Everyone has the right to be free from all forms of discriminatory treatment and is entitled to protection against such prejudices.
3. Cultural identity and traditional community rights deserve respect in line with changes in time and developments in civilization.
All of these sections are products of the amendment which placed more emphasis on the sections on human rights present in the original constitution. The foundations of this constitution were further strengthened with the ratification of the ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) through Law No. 12, 2005; as well as Law No. 39, 1999 on Human Rights and Law No. 26, 2000 on Human Rights Court. These all guaranteed the equal rights of citizens to freedom of religion and belief, as well as expression. What is more important, is that the implementation of all these laws was delegated to the state, particularly the government.
However, this very solid constitution is not automatically reflected in practice. In the legal context, there are at the least two fundamental problems, and this is before thorough research into legal practice has been undertaken. Firstly, is that the laws and regulations dating from before the constitutional that challenge or even contradict constitutional guarantees have not been automatically annulled and have not yet been changed in accordance with the constitution’s directives. Thus what results is discrepancy and even contradiction between the constitution and the laws under it. One law concerned with religious life is article 156a of the Criminal Code (KUHP) which is from Law PNPS No. 1/1966. It forbids a person or group of people from practicing and interpreting a belief which deviates from the main religion, of which there are six: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. The article stating this is popularly known as the “blasphemy” article. It reads:
Liable to a sentence of five years imprisonment for whosoever in public intentionally express their views or engage in actions:
1. that in principle incite hostilities and considered as abuse or defamation of a religion embraced in Indonesia;
2. for the purpose of discouraging others to embrace any religion that is based on the belief in the one and only God." (Article 156a of the Criminal Code)
This article has recently been used frequently by specific groups to demand that other groups, which they consider to have deviated from the mainstream understandings of the primary religions, be jailed on the count of blasphemy.
The second problem is that new drafts of laws and regulations since the amendment are, intentionally or not, often out of synchrony, or even in blatant contradiction, with the demands of the amendment. A clear example of this is found in the articles of the draft of the Criminal Code on religion. The article on “blasphemy” which, in the old KUHP was only one article, 156a, was, during the reformation era, the cause of many jailings, and in the new RKUHP has been broken down much further to now span 8 articles which, if seen from the perspective of religious freedom, highly contradicts the constitution’s principles (Rumadi et.al., 2007). Likewise the Law on Demographic Administration just legalized in 2006, which mentions the two categories of government “recognised religions” and “unrecognized religions” which automatically ignore belief in non-formal religions, such as in traditional religion (in the Indonesian context) or indigenous beliefs which, notabene, are original Indonesian faiths.
Article 8 of this law says:
(4) Obligation as it is intended in verse (1) refers to requirement procedures for the record of important events reported by citizens whose religion is not formally recognised in legal regulations, or by adherents of Indonesian traditional religions, as defined in legal regulations.
Article 61
(2) The explanation as intended in verse (1) refers to the religious labelling of citizens whose religion is not formally recognised in formal regulations or to the adherents of Indonesian traditional religions. In the civil registry, the category for religion will be left blank, though these citizens will still be served and registered.
Article 64
(2) The explanation on religion as intended in verse (1) refers to the religious labelling of citizens whose religion is not formally recognised in formal regulations or to the adherents of Indonesian traditional religions. In the civil registry, the category for religion will be left blank, though these citizens will still be served and registered. (Law No. 23 / 2006 on Demographic Administration)
These articles, besides contradicting the amendments, also have the potential to discriminate. For instance, it has implications for the public services concerning Identity Cards (KTP), and the Birth, Marriage and Inheritance registry.
Sadly, the use of article 156a KUHP has increased since the reformation. Based on records, this article was used only once prior to 1990, for the case against HB, who wrote the short story The Increasingly Cloudy Sky under the pseudonym Ki Panji Kusmin. He was accused of defaming Islam. As the chief editor of the magazine SASTRA in which the story was published, he was unwilling to reveal the real identity of the author (who was, unbeknown to the public, himself), and was thus sentenced to one year in jail in 1968. After this, in 1990 the article was used in a case against the chief editor of Tabloid Monitor, Arswendo Atmowiloto, also because of mass demands in relation to the tabloid’s survey which placed the Prophet Muhammad as the eleventh most admired figure. After 2000, reference to the article increased sharply, and in the period 2004-2008 there were at least ten cases (Rumadi, 2007). Public demands based on this article increased, not only in the courts, but also in direct political policies of the government, as shown in the case where about 7000 Muslims in robes surrounded the Presidential Palace to demand the release of a ban against the Ahmadiyah sect. In response, the government immediately released their policy, which limited Ahmadiyah’s expression, through the Joint Decree signed by the three ministers, the Minister for Religious Affairs, the Minister for Internal Affairs, and the Attorney General, on June 9, 2008. This joint decree has been followed by provincial regulations, for example, like that which has been recently issued by the South Sumatran governor, banning Ahmadiyah from his province.
Syariah-nuanced Local Regulations
In line with development of laws, the appearance of several religiously nuanced local regulations (‘Kanun’ in Aceh) needs to be examined separately. Robin Bush (2007) has already looked quantitatively at the recent spread of these religiously (particularly Islamically) nuanced regulations, finding that there are about 78 local regulations in 52 regencies and cities. This is not including decrees from regents, mayors and governors, or drafts that regional parliaments have not yet decided upon. If this growth continues, like it or not, it may influence the direction of the development of national law or even the constitution. The Supreme Court’s decision to reject the judicial review of the Tangerang Local Regulation (Nurun Nisa et.al., 2007) against prostitution which discriminates against women. The Court made the decision saying that it was not within the scope of the Supreme Court. It has evoked greater worry about such developments.
Suaedy
The appearance of these local regulations is not always religiously motivated. In fact they are sometimes products of political pragmatism and are outlets for those facing corruption charges, or even direct photocopies of regulations from other regions. However, their geometric progression and tendency to spread deserves out attention. Nevertheless, these phenomena need not be generalised. These regulations can be split into three categories. First, are the local regulations on issues of public order or civil morality such as regulations against gambling, prostitution and drinking. These issues have not only drawn the attention and commitment of people from specific religions, but of almost all people, each with their own motivations.
Second, are the regulations on religious ability and religious ritual obligations. This includes regulations on the obligation to read the Qur’an, pay zakat (alms), and so on. Such regulations are aimed specifically at Muslims, yet have the potential to discriminate against both Muslims themselves as well as other people. While the third category includes the regulations concerning religious symbols, such as the obligation for women to wear a jilbab, and for men to wear Muslim dress on Fridays. This third category of regulations, when put into practice, often causes discrimination, both in terms of public service by the government, as well as in the community itself. It discriminates not only against non-Muslims, but also against Muslims themselves (Suaedy et.al., 2007).
Indeed, with such categories, not all local regulations are fit to be dealt with on the constitutional level, but must rather be dealt with on several different levels to obtain proportional responses (Wahid Institute Report, 2008). First of all, paradigmatic and substantive parameters of these regulations need to be defined, and strong arguments provided for such definitions. For example, the state’s basis of the Pancasila and 1945 Constitution with all its amendments is the primary measure, while human rights principles must also be supportive. It is difficult to respond to regulations concerning aspects of public order, such as gambling, prostitution and drinking, on such a paradigmatic and substantive level because it is the joint concern and commitment of society.
For regulations of this kind, monitoring of their aims and the steps in their application is necessary. It is necessary because, for example, regulations of disbandment without solution cause mass unemployment and suffering. Monitoring is also needed of its methods of enforcement, for example such methods might include using violent means and redundant and discriminative criminalization. This being the case, advocacy would better fulfill the objective. Without real and evident standards or norms and a measured response such as this, it is feared that we will have a debate without basis.
The following parameter concerns the procedure for formation of regulations and the basis or preamble for these regulations. One important measure in this matter is Law No. 10, 2004 on procedures for forming laws. Included within it are procedures for forming local regulations and other rulings. It is important to test the consistency of the preamble, which serves as a base for regulations, against preexisting Indonesian laws. One must remember that some local regulations presumed valid in a specific region are only photocopies from other regions. This effectively minimizes full social participation, something regulated by the above mentioned Law as well as by the well intended efforts to resolve the social problems within the specific region. In addition, there are also various regulations such as decrees/official letters by Regents and Mayors which are based, for example, on MUI fatwas (religious rulings) or group opinion, and which ignore preexisting laws.
With these standards, efforts of advocacy will focus on the faults and deviations of the regulations without having to take it too high, for example to the constitutional level. The most dangerous aspect of all this is when the government interferes and judges non main stream beliefs. This judgment ends in the banning of the belief/religion/sect as evidenced by the decision made by The Coordinating Agency for Monitoring Religious Sects and Mystical Beliefs, under the coordination of The State Court (MRoRI- WI, No. 6). It violates the rights to expression and freedom of religion and belief.
The following standard concerns local political contexts. If it is indeed proven that local regulations or similar rulings are really only the political commodities of politicians used to attain a specific position, advocacy can be focused on this political commoditization. In South Sulawesi and Cianjur, for example, it has been proven that the “produce” of Syariah Islam (Islamic law) does not significantly impact the chances of a pair being elected as Governor or Regent. These areas known as “maniacs” in relation to Islamic law elected a Governor and vice Governor who hold visions of pluralism and tolerance, but a Regent who does not value such issues.
Occasionally, political issues do become major problems and this demands the courage and vision from those in the central government. But this remains unrealized. Theoretically, decrees/official letters of Regents, Mayors, and Governors which legally speaking are not procedural, for example regulations based on MUI fatwas, and also deviational local regulations, should be revoked by the Minister for Internal Affairs. But because the politics are complex, the government prefers to keep silent, worried about the political reaction which will diminish society’s trust in them. Thus the government needs the courage to take political risks in correcting constitutional deviations (Suaedy, 2006). The Minister for Internal Affairs could have cancelled the implementation of the provincial regulation in Lombok on zakat to allow the salary deductions from civil servants in the name of zakat collection. Unfortunately, the regulation was cancelled only after a huge demonstration and labor strike.
The Strengthening of Political Identity
Once again, the emphasis of the constitution on guaranteeing freedom of religion and belief has been seriously disrupted by the strengthening of religious groups in responding to the development of society and government policies. But in fact, these groups do not do anything to strengthen democracy by eradicating corruption and pushing for transparency. Instead, they strengthen primordialism based on religious grouping and similarity of beliefs. In the era where people can speak freely and the government has no choice but to listen to religious demands, deviation from constitutional and democratic principles is highly possible.
This situation is worsen by the fact that local leaders are inexperienced in managing society’s aspiration in democratic manner. It is not surprising if the government, both regional and central, executive, legislative and judicative, tends to listen to and prioritize the demands of the small number of people who speak loudest and who sometimes resort to intimidation or violence, over giving justice to the large but silent majority. Thus, the increasing influence of these religious groups has provided further obstacles to the implementation of democracy, and the enforcement of the constitution and law.
The strengthening of MUI’s (Indonesian Council of Ulama) role must be given special attention. It is visible in MUI’s ability to loudly voice their views and demands. What makes them stronger than most social organisations is their relationship with the state. MUI was established by Soeharto’s New Order regime. It has, from its establishment, been used as an instrument of the authoritarian government to support its power and handle religious movements against the government. Thus MUI has extensive infrastructure and networking. For instance, it has formal branches throughout Indonesia, in regencies and provinces. It also has informal branches at district level. All branches receive government funding. In addition, MUI also obtains extra funding from its own religious projects outside of government or public control. Examples include the halal labeling of foods and beverages, consultation positions in all the branches of Bank Syari’ah that have syariah (Islamic law) outlets, and specific political projects from the government, such as public education on specific drafts of law regarding religious issues (Suaedy et.al., 2006).
MUI’s membership system is not individual based as with other Islamic social organisations. Thus, any Islamic social organisation which shares the same doctrines and theology as MUI are free to join. As a result, it is almost as if MUI has the prerogative to determine whether an Islamic sect is legal or illegal, whether it is deviant or not, and also the beliefs its members must hold. Ahmadiyah, for example, can not become a member because MUI considers it deviant. Moreover, MUI has urged the government to ban it (MRoRI-WI No. 4). On the other hand, no matter how politically subversive it may be, if MUI deems a group as not deviant, they will be accommodated. The most visible example is Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). HTI’s doctrine states that they are an anti-democratic political organisation, or in religious terminology they ‘meng-haram-kan’ (forbid) democracy. Thus HTI is, from all perspectives, is against the Pancasila and 1945 constitution, and thus against the philosophic and constitutional basis of Indonesia, yet MUI welcomes them. HTI presence even extends throughout MUI, from the very center to the regions (Suaedy et.al., 2006).
This kind of membership system also means that MUI’s products and fatwa (religious decrees) tend to be conservative and in line with radical Islam. This is because there are not so many moderate Islamic organisations, even though those that do exist have enormous membership. In hearings or decision making, each MUI member organisation is given equal representation. So, despite the fact that Muhammadiyah and NU have between 25 to 40 or so million members, each of these organisations are given equal representation to FPI (Islamic Defenders Front), HTI and MMI (Indonesian Mujahadeen Council), all of which are radical and only have hundreds of thousands of members. There are thus very few moderate Islamic organisations in comparison to radical, conservative organisations, which grow like mushrooms during the wet season.
The subsequent result is that any Islamic organisations, including fundamentalist organisations and movements which are against democracy and the Pancasila, can become members of and can be dominant within MUI. The only exception is those groups declared terrorist, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). MUI is thus really a bunker for subversive and fundamentalist organisations and movements in Indonesia. Further, because MUI is funded by the government, these fundamentalist organisations and movements also receive indirect subsidies from the government through MUI. The government is thus helping radical and fundamentalist movements, which are even anti-Pancasila and anti-the 1945 constitution, with capacity building (Suaedy et.al., 2006). In 2005, for example, MUI released a fatwa against pluralism, liberalism and secularism. It was a fatwa that contradicted the existence of the Republic of Indonesia itself and has prompted specific groups to take the law into their own hands through force and violence against those they deem to have deviated from this very MUI fatwa. The fatwa 7/MUNAS VII/MUI/II/2005 states that:
1. Religious Pluralism, Secularism and Liberalism, as referred to in the first section, are ideologies that conflict with Islamic teachings.
2. Muslims are forbidden to embrace Religious Pluralism, Secularism and Liberalism.
The phenomena of the strengthening of MUI’s position and its radical and fundamentalist elements, have drastically increased since Susilo Bambang Yudoyono’s (SBY) presidency. This is because SBY is closer to Islamic political parties which are loyal in their support for him, including the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the Star and Crescent Party (PBB), and the United Development Party (PPP). The secular Democratic Party is the only exception to this, as it is the party SBY established himself; yet it lacks a sufficiently strong intellectual basis. Thus SBY’s presidency is, in practice, largely supported by the above Islamic parties.
SBY’s hidden and open connections to these Islamist parties reveals desires to establish an Islamic state. It can be seen in SBY’s appointment of K.H. Ma’ruf Amin, the head and the most radical and vocal MUI spokesperson on anti-pluralism and anti-freedom of religion and belief, as member of the presidential advisory council in the field of religion. The direction of SBY’s religious policy and perspective, and of religious freedom, is thus quite clear (See Van Zorge, January 29, 2008). There is so much inter-religious prostration and violence, and attacks and violence against groups deemed deviant, that the president can almost never be heard urging the state apparatus to be firmer and more just in dealing with the perpetrators of religious violence, as well as in protecting the victims of prostration and violence. He also cannot be heard expressing his desires for human rights and the constitution and its guarantee of religious freedom to be enforced. On the contrary, the president even opened MUI national work meeting in November 2007 by indicating his explicit support for and agreement with all MUI decisions. In this national work meeting MUI released the fatwa listing the ten criteria for deviant sects to be used as a guide for the Muslim community to independently monitor deviant sects. The consequences have been clear: increasingly uncontrollable inter-religious violence which tends to be destructive and pushes society to take justice into their own hands when it comes to so-considered deviant groups (MRoRI-WI No. 4). This fatwa on the ten criteria for deviance is as follows:
The Ten Guidelines for Monitoring Deviant Religious Sects
1. Disagree with the six Islamic principles of faith;
2. Believe and act differently to what the Qur'an and hadith teach.
3. Believe in decrees that come after the Qur'an.
4. Refuse the authenticity of the Qur'an.
5. Interprete the Qur’an differently from traditional interpretations.
6. Disagree that the hadith is another source of Islamic teaching.
7. Humiliate, despise or look down on prophets and messengers.
8. Do not recognise prophet Muhammad as the last prophet and messenger.
9. Change, add, or remove religious ritual priciples that are determined in syariah, such as "A person can go on the hajj without going to Mecca", and "a person does not have to pray five times a day”.
10. Label other Muslim’s infidel without a syariah-based explanation. For instance, they are infidel just because they do not come from the same Islamic group.
The constitution strongly guarantees citizens, as both individuals and in groups, the right to adhere to a religion and belief, as well as the right to equal and fair protection. But it is clear that in practice quite the contrary occurs. Under SBY’s governance, the state and all its apparatus has been widely involved and discrimatory in issues of the religion and belief of citizens (Van Zorge Report, January 29, 2008).
Collective Violence
Political changes in Indonesia, both the drastic ones of 1965 and 1998 and more gradual ones like the general elections, always have violent elements, to the extent that one researcher labeled Indonesia as a “state of violence” (Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad, 2002). The general elections of the New Order, particularly the 1971 election which was a continuation of the 1965 political configuration, remain undefeated in enormity of their violence. As a result, we need to give attention to times of political formation, such as the current era which is a continuation from the drastic change of 1998.
If we look at the trend so far, inter-communal violence - religious, ethnic and so on – has a increased and government apparatus has been unable to control it. Moreover, religious institutions, especially government affiliated ones, intentionally or not, contribute to the tension and encourage the masses to commit violence. This was the case with the MUI fatwa on deviant sects, and also on Ahmadiyah, and also the case with the Department of Religious Affairs’ insinuations.
UNSFIR’s 2004 report, for example, on “Patterns of Collective Violence in Indonesia 1990-2003” contained shocking data on the amount of collective violence in Indonesia. Collective here refers to violence which occurs between ethnic groups, between adherents of different religions, of between adherents of the same religion but different sects or groups.
These data showed that 89.3% of communal violence resulted in victims, and communal violence accounted for 16.6% of incidents that did not produce victims from all the violence that occurred in Indonesia from 1990-2003. Violence, according to this research, occurred in almost all Indonesian provinces, yet its increase was not uniform over all provinces. Yet it has been collective violence which has always caused the worst destruction and loss to human life and property in comparison to other forms of violence (Ashutosh et.al., pp. 25-27). This does not even include the violence in the Ambon or Moluccas case of Muslims verses Christians, or West Kalimantan case of ethnic Dayaks verses the Madurese.
Over the years from 2004-2006 the Wahid Institute has recorded, as far as can be obtained from the quite restricted mass media, at least 28 cases of violence in several complex forms of collective violence, not only inter-religious but also intra-religious (Suaedy, 2007).
Meanwhile, from 2007 to mid-2008, there have been 58 cases: 18 cases of accusations of deviance; 28 cases of inter- and intra- religious violence; 2 cases of religiously based regulations; and 6 freedom of expression cases protesting against speaking freely to people of specific religions due to religious reasons (Wahid Institute Report, 2008a);
Unavoidable Transformation
The above discussion shows that political change should not stop after the establishment of democratic political institutions, but needs to be accompanied by transformation of thinking. This transformation should also be accompanied by more just social formations and legal reformation that enables the development of a democratic culture. Democratic development now faces horizontal challenges, in comparison to during the New Order era in which it faced vertical challenges from the government and particularly the military.
Various analyses of the obstacles in the way of democracy indicate that the weakness of civil society is the major obstacle. It is weak both in offering more fair social and political formulations as well as in speaking out against deviation from democratic procedures. Such weakness has widespread consequences. For example, the recruitment of politicians who prioritize money politics and accept any means of doing things has resulted in deviation from democratic order and deviation from the ideal objectives of democracy itself (Wahid Institute Report 2008).
Using democracy as justification, those with money and certain primordial group leaders can use what they have to force their desires (often violently) to achieve what they want. They do so not only in cases of religious freedom, but also in almost all important decision making processes. SBY’s indecisiveness has allowed the democratic process to be dominated by destructive elements.
In this perspective, SBY’s presidency has been highly tolerant to what Appleby describes as religious illiteracy—a shallow and ignorant religious understanding which easily resorts to violence at times of sudden change or crisis (Appleby, 2000:69). Continued provocation by the leaders of this religious illiteracy, which SBY’s government has allowed, even met the demands of at times, has been sufficient to spread hatred and violence. As a result, the establishment of religious literacy has been threatened when the leaders of illiterate religions or religious doctrines are questioned critically over their legality in the process of change, while those who want to discuss religious issues and place them in social reality with the aim to find rational solutions are isolated, even threatened.
There is high potential for the growth of social groups, particularly those with links to religious communities, who want to push for more substantial, just and critical social political participation, to be ignored. In fact, lately there have been arrests of civil society groups speaking out against the government. The leader of the Indonesian Awakening Movement (GIB) is a case in point.
The indications and tendencies of the democratic process in Indonesia as seen in the cases of freedom of religion and belief, and the spread of communal violence, would suggest there is still a way to go before democracy is stable. It requires hard work and determination to initiate the process and to smoothly and safely achieve the desired aims.***
Depok, Indonesia, September 12, 2008
*This paper presented at INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM Islam for Social Justice and sustainability:New Perspective on Islams and Pluralism in Indonesia Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), Kyoto University, Kyoto, JAPAN September, 16-17th, 2008.
**The writer is Executive Director the Wahid Institute, Jakarta
References:
Appleby, R. S. 2000, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion and Violence, and Reconciliation, New York: Rowman & Littlefied Publishers, Inc.
Colombijn, Freek and Lindblad, J. Thomas (ed.), 2002, “Introduction,” dalam Roots of Violence in Indonesia, KITLV Press, The Netherlands.
Gamal Ferdhi et.al., 2006, “Depancasialisasi Lewat Perda SI,” Supplement of the Wahid Institute in GATRA magazine, 29 April 2006.
Laclau, E. (ed.), 1990, “Introduction”, in The Making of Political Identity New York: Verso, pp. 1-8.
Nurun Nisa et.al., 2007, “Bersama Menolak Perda Diskriminatif, “ in NAWALA the Wahid Institute, available at: http://www.wahidinstitute.org/indonesia/images/stories/Nawala/nawala-v.pdf.
Robin L. Bush, 2007, “Regional ‘Shari’ah’ Regulation in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?” Working paper presented at the Indonesia Update forum, September 2007 at ANU, Canberra (unpublished).
Rumadi et.al., March 2006, “Menanti Negara Bernyali” Supplement of the Wahid Institute in GATRA magazine.
Rumadi, 2007, Delik Penodaan Agama Dan Kehidupan Beragama dalam R-KUHP, The Wahid Institute-TIFA, Jakarta.
Saidi, A. (ed.), 2004, Menekuk Agama, Membangun Tahta, Kebijakan Agama Orde Baru Jakarta: Desantara.
Suaedy et.al., 2006, Kala Fatwa Jadi Penjara, The Wahid Institute, Jakarta 2006.
Suaedy et.al., 2007, Politisasi Agama Dan Konflik Komunal, The Wahid Institute,
Suaedy, 2007, "Gerakan Muslim Progresif Paska Rejim Suharto di Indonesia,” (research report, unpublished).
Van Zorge Report, January 29, 2008.
Varshney, A. et.al., “Patterns of Collective Violence in Indonesia (1990-2003),” UNSFIR (United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery) Jakarta, July 2004.
Wahid Institute Report, 2008, “Perda Bernuansa Agama dan Arah Demokrasi Indonesia,” Research Report (unpublished).
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http://www.wahidinstitute.org/indonesia/images/stories/Nawala/nawala-vi.pdf
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READ MORE - Working Paper Collective Violence, Religious Freedom and Democratization in Indonesia
By Ahmad Suaedy
It is almost as if democracy and decentralization in Indonesia is irreversible. These processes have thus far continued through the establishment of democratic pillar institutions along side supporting institutions, such as the general elections which have been independently managed by the General Election Commission (KPU), both national elections for parliament and the presidency and also elections for regional heads; the removal of military institutions from national political and economic domination; as well as freedom of the press. All this was impossible to even dream about during the New Order ten years ago.
More important than this is the reassertion of the existence of the Indonesian nation through amendments to the 1945 constitution, which is principally a secular state in that it is based on equality of all citizens in the face of the law without discrimination against religion, skin colour, race, gender or class, and in that it is also based on human rights principles. Thus, constitutionally, Pancasila principles form the philosophical basis of the Indonesian nation, that is, Belief in One Almighty God; Just and Civilized Humanity; the Unity of Indonesia; Democracy Guided by the Wisdom of Representative Deliberation; and Social Justice for all Indonesians. These principles were strengthened, once again, as the democratic foundation of Indonesia at precisely the same time that post-New Order changes began to occur.
However, new challenges have emerged and have the potential to threaten the process of democratization and decentralization. Namely, the strengthening of political identity which has threatened to undermine the foundations of the constitution itself. Since this, various models of violence have emerged, particularly collective violence between groups, based on religion or ethnicity or any other categorization. At the same time, state and government guarantees of religious freedom have been waived due to demands of specific groups, which have involved force and even violence, against other sects. Such groups have thus forced the government to take actions which have restricted religious freedoms. The Joint Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and the Attorney General in June 2008 limited the movements of Ahmadiyah, a Muslim sect, and was indicative of the government’s lack of power in facing demands from groups opposing religious freedom.
Instead of protecting attacked groups from their attackers, the state apparatus has often worsened the victims’ financial situations by physically evacuating them while allowing their attackers to destroy their property. The state apparatus then brings the victims to court on the count of blasphemy. If this tendency is allowed to continue, it is feared that it will plant seeds of discrimination to the point that the government can no longer make any guarantees, and will culminate in demands to alter the constitution. Thus the opposing demands of collective violence and religious freedom can hinder or become a point of reversal to the achievement of democracy in the form of justice and equality of all citizens in the face of the law.
The Basis of Indonesian Democracy: Theory and Practice
The strengthening of the democratic base is reflected in the reassertion of guarantees of equality of all citizens of all groups, as well as the guarantee of human rights through various sections in the constitution. In the 1945 constitution on the topic of human rights section 28 emphasises the guarantee of equality of all citizens and the obligation of the state to protect them, as well as the right of citizens to hold a religion or belief. “Everyone has the right to secure equal opportunity in the government. Everyone has the right to citizenship status.” (verse 28D). In the same section, point E mentions the right to adhere to, carry out, and even propagate a religion. It does not mention specific religions:
Everyone is entitled to the right to profess and practice the religion of his choice, to choose an appropriate education and teaching method, to choose proper employment, to choose nationality, to choose a place of residence within the territory of a State and the right to leave it as well as to return.
Everyone has the right to the freedom of embracing a religion or belief, the right to hold opinions and to act and behave according to one’s conscience.
Everyone has the right to the freedom of association, assembly and expression.
Also, in the same section, point I items 2 and 3 guarantee the absence of discrimination in any form, as well as respect for identity and community traditions:
2. Everyone has the right to be free from all forms of discriminatory treatment and is entitled to protection against such prejudices.
3. Cultural identity and traditional community rights deserve respect in line with changes in time and developments in civilization.
All of these sections are products of the amendment which placed more emphasis on the sections on human rights present in the original constitution. The foundations of this constitution were further strengthened with the ratification of the ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) through Law No. 12, 2005; as well as Law No. 39, 1999 on Human Rights and Law No. 26, 2000 on Human Rights Court. These all guaranteed the equal rights of citizens to freedom of religion and belief, as well as expression. What is more important, is that the implementation of all these laws was delegated to the state, particularly the government.
However, this very solid constitution is not automatically reflected in practice. In the legal context, there are at the least two fundamental problems, and this is before thorough research into legal practice has been undertaken. Firstly, is that the laws and regulations dating from before the constitutional that challenge or even contradict constitutional guarantees have not been automatically annulled and have not yet been changed in accordance with the constitution’s directives. Thus what results is discrepancy and even contradiction between the constitution and the laws under it. One law concerned with religious life is article 156a of the Criminal Code (KUHP) which is from Law PNPS No. 1/1966. It forbids a person or group of people from practicing and interpreting a belief which deviates from the main religion, of which there are six: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. The article stating this is popularly known as the “blasphemy” article. It reads:
Liable to a sentence of five years imprisonment for whosoever in public intentionally express their views or engage in actions:
1. that in principle incite hostilities and considered as abuse or defamation of a religion embraced in Indonesia;
2. for the purpose of discouraging others to embrace any religion that is based on the belief in the one and only God." (Article 156a of the Criminal Code)
This article has recently been used frequently by specific groups to demand that other groups, which they consider to have deviated from the mainstream understandings of the primary religions, be jailed on the count of blasphemy.
The second problem is that new drafts of laws and regulations since the amendment are, intentionally or not, often out of synchrony, or even in blatant contradiction, with the demands of the amendment. A clear example of this is found in the articles of the draft of the Criminal Code on religion. The article on “blasphemy” which, in the old KUHP was only one article, 156a, was, during the reformation era, the cause of many jailings, and in the new RKUHP has been broken down much further to now span 8 articles which, if seen from the perspective of religious freedom, highly contradicts the constitution’s principles (Rumadi et.al., 2007). Likewise the Law on Demographic Administration just legalized in 2006, which mentions the two categories of government “recognised religions” and “unrecognized religions” which automatically ignore belief in non-formal religions, such as in traditional religion (in the Indonesian context) or indigenous beliefs which, notabene, are original Indonesian faiths.
Article 8 of this law says:
(4) Obligation as it is intended in verse (1) refers to requirement procedures for the record of important events reported by citizens whose religion is not formally recognised in legal regulations, or by adherents of Indonesian traditional religions, as defined in legal regulations.
Article 61
(2) The explanation as intended in verse (1) refers to the religious labelling of citizens whose religion is not formally recognised in formal regulations or to the adherents of Indonesian traditional religions. In the civil registry, the category for religion will be left blank, though these citizens will still be served and registered.
Article 64
(2) The explanation on religion as intended in verse (1) refers to the religious labelling of citizens whose religion is not formally recognised in formal regulations or to the adherents of Indonesian traditional religions. In the civil registry, the category for religion will be left blank, though these citizens will still be served and registered. (Law No. 23 / 2006 on Demographic Administration)
These articles, besides contradicting the amendments, also have the potential to discriminate. For instance, it has implications for the public services concerning Identity Cards (KTP), and the Birth, Marriage and Inheritance registry.
Sadly, the use of article 156a KUHP has increased since the reformation. Based on records, this article was used only once prior to 1990, for the case against HB, who wrote the short story The Increasingly Cloudy Sky under the pseudonym Ki Panji Kusmin. He was accused of defaming Islam. As the chief editor of the magazine SASTRA in which the story was published, he was unwilling to reveal the real identity of the author (who was, unbeknown to the public, himself), and was thus sentenced to one year in jail in 1968. After this, in 1990 the article was used in a case against the chief editor of Tabloid Monitor, Arswendo Atmowiloto, also because of mass demands in relation to the tabloid’s survey which placed the Prophet Muhammad as the eleventh most admired figure. After 2000, reference to the article increased sharply, and in the period 2004-2008 there were at least ten cases (Rumadi, 2007). Public demands based on this article increased, not only in the courts, but also in direct political policies of the government, as shown in the case where about 7000 Muslims in robes surrounded the Presidential Palace to demand the release of a ban against the Ahmadiyah sect. In response, the government immediately released their policy, which limited Ahmadiyah’s expression, through the Joint Decree signed by the three ministers, the Minister for Religious Affairs, the Minister for Internal Affairs, and the Attorney General, on June 9, 2008. This joint decree has been followed by provincial regulations, for example, like that which has been recently issued by the South Sumatran governor, banning Ahmadiyah from his province.
Syariah-nuanced Local Regulations
In line with development of laws, the appearance of several religiously nuanced local regulations (‘Kanun’ in Aceh) needs to be examined separately. Robin Bush (2007) has already looked quantitatively at the recent spread of these religiously (particularly Islamically) nuanced regulations, finding that there are about 78 local regulations in 52 regencies and cities. This is not including decrees from regents, mayors and governors, or drafts that regional parliaments have not yet decided upon. If this growth continues, like it or not, it may influence the direction of the development of national law or even the constitution. The Supreme Court’s decision to reject the judicial review of the Tangerang Local Regulation (Nurun Nisa et.al., 2007) against prostitution which discriminates against women. The Court made the decision saying that it was not within the scope of the Supreme Court. It has evoked greater worry about such developments.
Suaedy
The appearance of these local regulations is not always religiously motivated. In fact they are sometimes products of political pragmatism and are outlets for those facing corruption charges, or even direct photocopies of regulations from other regions. However, their geometric progression and tendency to spread deserves out attention. Nevertheless, these phenomena need not be generalised. These regulations can be split into three categories. First, are the local regulations on issues of public order or civil morality such as regulations against gambling, prostitution and drinking. These issues have not only drawn the attention and commitment of people from specific religions, but of almost all people, each with their own motivations.
Second, are the regulations on religious ability and religious ritual obligations. This includes regulations on the obligation to read the Qur’an, pay zakat (alms), and so on. Such regulations are aimed specifically at Muslims, yet have the potential to discriminate against both Muslims themselves as well as other people. While the third category includes the regulations concerning religious symbols, such as the obligation for women to wear a jilbab, and for men to wear Muslim dress on Fridays. This third category of regulations, when put into practice, often causes discrimination, both in terms of public service by the government, as well as in the community itself. It discriminates not only against non-Muslims, but also against Muslims themselves (Suaedy et.al., 2007).
Indeed, with such categories, not all local regulations are fit to be dealt with on the constitutional level, but must rather be dealt with on several different levels to obtain proportional responses (Wahid Institute Report, 2008). First of all, paradigmatic and substantive parameters of these regulations need to be defined, and strong arguments provided for such definitions. For example, the state’s basis of the Pancasila and 1945 Constitution with all its amendments is the primary measure, while human rights principles must also be supportive. It is difficult to respond to regulations concerning aspects of public order, such as gambling, prostitution and drinking, on such a paradigmatic and substantive level because it is the joint concern and commitment of society.
For regulations of this kind, monitoring of their aims and the steps in their application is necessary. It is necessary because, for example, regulations of disbandment without solution cause mass unemployment and suffering. Monitoring is also needed of its methods of enforcement, for example such methods might include using violent means and redundant and discriminative criminalization. This being the case, advocacy would better fulfill the objective. Without real and evident standards or norms and a measured response such as this, it is feared that we will have a debate without basis.
The following parameter concerns the procedure for formation of regulations and the basis or preamble for these regulations. One important measure in this matter is Law No. 10, 2004 on procedures for forming laws. Included within it are procedures for forming local regulations and other rulings. It is important to test the consistency of the preamble, which serves as a base for regulations, against preexisting Indonesian laws. One must remember that some local regulations presumed valid in a specific region are only photocopies from other regions. This effectively minimizes full social participation, something regulated by the above mentioned Law as well as by the well intended efforts to resolve the social problems within the specific region. In addition, there are also various regulations such as decrees/official letters by Regents and Mayors which are based, for example, on MUI fatwas (religious rulings) or group opinion, and which ignore preexisting laws.
With these standards, efforts of advocacy will focus on the faults and deviations of the regulations without having to take it too high, for example to the constitutional level. The most dangerous aspect of all this is when the government interferes and judges non main stream beliefs. This judgment ends in the banning of the belief/religion/sect as evidenced by the decision made by The Coordinating Agency for Monitoring Religious Sects and Mystical Beliefs, under the coordination of The State Court (MRoRI- WI, No. 6). It violates the rights to expression and freedom of religion and belief.
The following standard concerns local political contexts. If it is indeed proven that local regulations or similar rulings are really only the political commodities of politicians used to attain a specific position, advocacy can be focused on this political commoditization. In South Sulawesi and Cianjur, for example, it has been proven that the “produce” of Syariah Islam (Islamic law) does not significantly impact the chances of a pair being elected as Governor or Regent. These areas known as “maniacs” in relation to Islamic law elected a Governor and vice Governor who hold visions of pluralism and tolerance, but a Regent who does not value such issues.
Occasionally, political issues do become major problems and this demands the courage and vision from those in the central government. But this remains unrealized. Theoretically, decrees/official letters of Regents, Mayors, and Governors which legally speaking are not procedural, for example regulations based on MUI fatwas, and also deviational local regulations, should be revoked by the Minister for Internal Affairs. But because the politics are complex, the government prefers to keep silent, worried about the political reaction which will diminish society’s trust in them. Thus the government needs the courage to take political risks in correcting constitutional deviations (Suaedy, 2006). The Minister for Internal Affairs could have cancelled the implementation of the provincial regulation in Lombok on zakat to allow the salary deductions from civil servants in the name of zakat collection. Unfortunately, the regulation was cancelled only after a huge demonstration and labor strike.
The Strengthening of Political Identity
Once again, the emphasis of the constitution on guaranteeing freedom of religion and belief has been seriously disrupted by the strengthening of religious groups in responding to the development of society and government policies. But in fact, these groups do not do anything to strengthen democracy by eradicating corruption and pushing for transparency. Instead, they strengthen primordialism based on religious grouping and similarity of beliefs. In the era where people can speak freely and the government has no choice but to listen to religious demands, deviation from constitutional and democratic principles is highly possible.
This situation is worsen by the fact that local leaders are inexperienced in managing society’s aspiration in democratic manner. It is not surprising if the government, both regional and central, executive, legislative and judicative, tends to listen to and prioritize the demands of the small number of people who speak loudest and who sometimes resort to intimidation or violence, over giving justice to the large but silent majority. Thus, the increasing influence of these religious groups has provided further obstacles to the implementation of democracy, and the enforcement of the constitution and law.
The strengthening of MUI’s (Indonesian Council of Ulama) role must be given special attention. It is visible in MUI’s ability to loudly voice their views and demands. What makes them stronger than most social organisations is their relationship with the state. MUI was established by Soeharto’s New Order regime. It has, from its establishment, been used as an instrument of the authoritarian government to support its power and handle religious movements against the government. Thus MUI has extensive infrastructure and networking. For instance, it has formal branches throughout Indonesia, in regencies and provinces. It also has informal branches at district level. All branches receive government funding. In addition, MUI also obtains extra funding from its own religious projects outside of government or public control. Examples include the halal labeling of foods and beverages, consultation positions in all the branches of Bank Syari’ah that have syariah (Islamic law) outlets, and specific political projects from the government, such as public education on specific drafts of law regarding religious issues (Suaedy et.al., 2006).
MUI’s membership system is not individual based as with other Islamic social organisations. Thus, any Islamic social organisation which shares the same doctrines and theology as MUI are free to join. As a result, it is almost as if MUI has the prerogative to determine whether an Islamic sect is legal or illegal, whether it is deviant or not, and also the beliefs its members must hold. Ahmadiyah, for example, can not become a member because MUI considers it deviant. Moreover, MUI has urged the government to ban it (MRoRI-WI No. 4). On the other hand, no matter how politically subversive it may be, if MUI deems a group as not deviant, they will be accommodated. The most visible example is Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). HTI’s doctrine states that they are an anti-democratic political organisation, or in religious terminology they ‘meng-haram-kan’ (forbid) democracy. Thus HTI is, from all perspectives, is against the Pancasila and 1945 constitution, and thus against the philosophic and constitutional basis of Indonesia, yet MUI welcomes them. HTI presence even extends throughout MUI, from the very center to the regions (Suaedy et.al., 2006).
This kind of membership system also means that MUI’s products and fatwa (religious decrees) tend to be conservative and in line with radical Islam. This is because there are not so many moderate Islamic organisations, even though those that do exist have enormous membership. In hearings or decision making, each MUI member organisation is given equal representation. So, despite the fact that Muhammadiyah and NU have between 25 to 40 or so million members, each of these organisations are given equal representation to FPI (Islamic Defenders Front), HTI and MMI (Indonesian Mujahadeen Council), all of which are radical and only have hundreds of thousands of members. There are thus very few moderate Islamic organisations in comparison to radical, conservative organisations, which grow like mushrooms during the wet season.
The subsequent result is that any Islamic organisations, including fundamentalist organisations and movements which are against democracy and the Pancasila, can become members of and can be dominant within MUI. The only exception is those groups declared terrorist, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). MUI is thus really a bunker for subversive and fundamentalist organisations and movements in Indonesia. Further, because MUI is funded by the government, these fundamentalist organisations and movements also receive indirect subsidies from the government through MUI. The government is thus helping radical and fundamentalist movements, which are even anti-Pancasila and anti-the 1945 constitution, with capacity building (Suaedy et.al., 2006). In 2005, for example, MUI released a fatwa against pluralism, liberalism and secularism. It was a fatwa that contradicted the existence of the Republic of Indonesia itself and has prompted specific groups to take the law into their own hands through force and violence against those they deem to have deviated from this very MUI fatwa. The fatwa 7/MUNAS VII/MUI/II/2005 states that:
1. Religious Pluralism, Secularism and Liberalism, as referred to in the first section, are ideologies that conflict with Islamic teachings.
2. Muslims are forbidden to embrace Religious Pluralism, Secularism and Liberalism.
The phenomena of the strengthening of MUI’s position and its radical and fundamentalist elements, have drastically increased since Susilo Bambang Yudoyono’s (SBY) presidency. This is because SBY is closer to Islamic political parties which are loyal in their support for him, including the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the Star and Crescent Party (PBB), and the United Development Party (PPP). The secular Democratic Party is the only exception to this, as it is the party SBY established himself; yet it lacks a sufficiently strong intellectual basis. Thus SBY’s presidency is, in practice, largely supported by the above Islamic parties.
SBY’s hidden and open connections to these Islamist parties reveals desires to establish an Islamic state. It can be seen in SBY’s appointment of K.H. Ma’ruf Amin, the head and the most radical and vocal MUI spokesperson on anti-pluralism and anti-freedom of religion and belief, as member of the presidential advisory council in the field of religion. The direction of SBY’s religious policy and perspective, and of religious freedom, is thus quite clear (See Van Zorge, January 29, 2008). There is so much inter-religious prostration and violence, and attacks and violence against groups deemed deviant, that the president can almost never be heard urging the state apparatus to be firmer and more just in dealing with the perpetrators of religious violence, as well as in protecting the victims of prostration and violence. He also cannot be heard expressing his desires for human rights and the constitution and its guarantee of religious freedom to be enforced. On the contrary, the president even opened MUI national work meeting in November 2007 by indicating his explicit support for and agreement with all MUI decisions. In this national work meeting MUI released the fatwa listing the ten criteria for deviant sects to be used as a guide for the Muslim community to independently monitor deviant sects. The consequences have been clear: increasingly uncontrollable inter-religious violence which tends to be destructive and pushes society to take justice into their own hands when it comes to so-considered deviant groups (MRoRI-WI No. 4). This fatwa on the ten criteria for deviance is as follows:
The Ten Guidelines for Monitoring Deviant Religious Sects
1. Disagree with the six Islamic principles of faith;
2. Believe and act differently to what the Qur'an and hadith teach.
3. Believe in decrees that come after the Qur'an.
4. Refuse the authenticity of the Qur'an.
5. Interprete the Qur’an differently from traditional interpretations.
6. Disagree that the hadith is another source of Islamic teaching.
7. Humiliate, despise or look down on prophets and messengers.
8. Do not recognise prophet Muhammad as the last prophet and messenger.
9. Change, add, or remove religious ritual priciples that are determined in syariah, such as "A person can go on the hajj without going to Mecca", and "a person does not have to pray five times a day”.
10. Label other Muslim’s infidel without a syariah-based explanation. For instance, they are infidel just because they do not come from the same Islamic group.
The constitution strongly guarantees citizens, as both individuals and in groups, the right to adhere to a religion and belief, as well as the right to equal and fair protection. But it is clear that in practice quite the contrary occurs. Under SBY’s governance, the state and all its apparatus has been widely involved and discrimatory in issues of the religion and belief of citizens (Van Zorge Report, January 29, 2008).
Collective Violence
Political changes in Indonesia, both the drastic ones of 1965 and 1998 and more gradual ones like the general elections, always have violent elements, to the extent that one researcher labeled Indonesia as a “state of violence” (Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad, 2002). The general elections of the New Order, particularly the 1971 election which was a continuation of the 1965 political configuration, remain undefeated in enormity of their violence. As a result, we need to give attention to times of political formation, such as the current era which is a continuation from the drastic change of 1998.
If we look at the trend so far, inter-communal violence - religious, ethnic and so on – has a increased and government apparatus has been unable to control it. Moreover, religious institutions, especially government affiliated ones, intentionally or not, contribute to the tension and encourage the masses to commit violence. This was the case with the MUI fatwa on deviant sects, and also on Ahmadiyah, and also the case with the Department of Religious Affairs’ insinuations.
UNSFIR’s 2004 report, for example, on “Patterns of Collective Violence in Indonesia 1990-2003” contained shocking data on the amount of collective violence in Indonesia. Collective here refers to violence which occurs between ethnic groups, between adherents of different religions, of between adherents of the same religion but different sects or groups.
These data showed that 89.3% of communal violence resulted in victims, and communal violence accounted for 16.6% of incidents that did not produce victims from all the violence that occurred in Indonesia from 1990-2003. Violence, according to this research, occurred in almost all Indonesian provinces, yet its increase was not uniform over all provinces. Yet it has been collective violence which has always caused the worst destruction and loss to human life and property in comparison to other forms of violence (Ashutosh et.al., pp. 25-27). This does not even include the violence in the Ambon or Moluccas case of Muslims verses Christians, or West Kalimantan case of ethnic Dayaks verses the Madurese.
Over the years from 2004-2006 the Wahid Institute has recorded, as far as can be obtained from the quite restricted mass media, at least 28 cases of violence in several complex forms of collective violence, not only inter-religious but also intra-religious (Suaedy, 2007).
Meanwhile, from 2007 to mid-2008, there have been 58 cases: 18 cases of accusations of deviance; 28 cases of inter- and intra- religious violence; 2 cases of religiously based regulations; and 6 freedom of expression cases protesting against speaking freely to people of specific religions due to religious reasons (Wahid Institute Report, 2008a);
Unavoidable Transformation
The above discussion shows that political change should not stop after the establishment of democratic political institutions, but needs to be accompanied by transformation of thinking. This transformation should also be accompanied by more just social formations and legal reformation that enables the development of a democratic culture. Democratic development now faces horizontal challenges, in comparison to during the New Order era in which it faced vertical challenges from the government and particularly the military.
Various analyses of the obstacles in the way of democracy indicate that the weakness of civil society is the major obstacle. It is weak both in offering more fair social and political formulations as well as in speaking out against deviation from democratic procedures. Such weakness has widespread consequences. For example, the recruitment of politicians who prioritize money politics and accept any means of doing things has resulted in deviation from democratic order and deviation from the ideal objectives of democracy itself (Wahid Institute Report 2008).
Using democracy as justification, those with money and certain primordial group leaders can use what they have to force their desires (often violently) to achieve what they want. They do so not only in cases of religious freedom, but also in almost all important decision making processes. SBY’s indecisiveness has allowed the democratic process to be dominated by destructive elements.
In this perspective, SBY’s presidency has been highly tolerant to what Appleby describes as religious illiteracy—a shallow and ignorant religious understanding which easily resorts to violence at times of sudden change or crisis (Appleby, 2000:69). Continued provocation by the leaders of this religious illiteracy, which SBY’s government has allowed, even met the demands of at times, has been sufficient to spread hatred and violence. As a result, the establishment of religious literacy has been threatened when the leaders of illiterate religions or religious doctrines are questioned critically over their legality in the process of change, while those who want to discuss religious issues and place them in social reality with the aim to find rational solutions are isolated, even threatened.
There is high potential for the growth of social groups, particularly those with links to religious communities, who want to push for more substantial, just and critical social political participation, to be ignored. In fact, lately there have been arrests of civil society groups speaking out against the government. The leader of the Indonesian Awakening Movement (GIB) is a case in point.
The indications and tendencies of the democratic process in Indonesia as seen in the cases of freedom of religion and belief, and the spread of communal violence, would suggest there is still a way to go before democracy is stable. It requires hard work and determination to initiate the process and to smoothly and safely achieve the desired aims.***
Depok, Indonesia, September 12, 2008
*This paper presented at INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM Islam for Social Justice and sustainability:New Perspective on Islams and Pluralism in Indonesia Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), Kyoto University, Kyoto, JAPAN September, 16-17th, 2008.
**The writer is Executive Director the Wahid Institute, Jakarta
References:
Appleby, R. S. 2000, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion and Violence, and Reconciliation, New York: Rowman & Littlefied Publishers, Inc.
Colombijn, Freek and Lindblad, J. Thomas (ed.), 2002, “Introduction,” dalam Roots of Violence in Indonesia, KITLV Press, The Netherlands.
Gamal Ferdhi et.al., 2006, “Depancasialisasi Lewat Perda SI,” Supplement of the Wahid Institute in GATRA magazine, 29 April 2006.
Laclau, E. (ed.), 1990, “Introduction”, in The Making of Political Identity New York: Verso, pp. 1-8.
Nurun Nisa et.al., 2007, “Bersama Menolak Perda Diskriminatif, “ in NAWALA the Wahid Institute, available at: http://www.wahidinstitute.org/indonesia/images/stories/Nawala/nawala-v.pdf.
Robin L. Bush, 2007, “Regional ‘Shari’ah’ Regulation in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?” Working paper presented at the Indonesia Update forum, September 2007 at ANU, Canberra (unpublished).
Rumadi et.al., March 2006, “Menanti Negara Bernyali” Supplement of the Wahid Institute in GATRA magazine.
Rumadi, 2007, Delik Penodaan Agama Dan Kehidupan Beragama dalam R-KUHP, The Wahid Institute-TIFA, Jakarta.
Saidi, A. (ed.), 2004, Menekuk Agama, Membangun Tahta, Kebijakan Agama Orde Baru Jakarta: Desantara.
Suaedy et.al., 2006, Kala Fatwa Jadi Penjara, The Wahid Institute, Jakarta 2006.
Suaedy et.al., 2007, Politisasi Agama Dan Konflik Komunal, The Wahid Institute,
Suaedy, 2007, "Gerakan Muslim Progresif Paska Rejim Suharto di Indonesia,” (research report, unpublished).
Van Zorge Report, January 29, 2008.
Varshney, A. et.al., “Patterns of Collective Violence in Indonesia (1990-2003),” UNSFIR (United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery) Jakarta, July 2004.
Wahid Institute Report, 2008, “Perda Bernuansa Agama dan Arah Demokrasi Indonesia,” Research Report (unpublished).
Wahid Institute Report, 2008a, “Laporan Tengah Tahun 2008 tentang Kebebasan beragama dan Kerkeyakinan,” Research Report (unpublished).
http://www.gusdur.net/indonesia/images/stories/monthlyreport/MonthlyReport-V-english.pdf
http://www.gusdur.net/indonesia/images/stories/monthlyreport/MonthlyReport-IV-english.pdf
http://www.gusdur.net/indonesia/images/stories/monthlyreport/MonthlyReport-VI-bahasa.pdf
http://www.wahidinstitute.org/indonesia/images/stories/Nawala/nawala-i.pdf
http://www.wahidinstitute.org/indonesia/images/stories/Nawala/nawala-v.pdf
http://www.wahidinstitute.org/indonesia/images/stories/Nawala/nawala-vi.pdf
http://www.wahidinstitute.org/indonesia/images/stories/SUPLEMENGATRA/gatraedisi-vii.pdf.
Friday, October 31, 2008
Obama and mass media
The Ad Campaign: An Obama Infomercial, Big, Glossy and Almost Unavoidable
By Jim Rutenberg
THE PROGRAM The program gave a new meaning to the word “infomercial” and, for that matter, to all notions of political advertising. Executed with high standards of cinematography, with help from the director of “An Inconvenient Truth,” Davis Guggenheim, the infomercial was part slickly produced reality program; part Lifetime biography; and part wonkish policy lecture with music that could have come from “The West Wing.”
Its imagery was acutely Middle American: suburban lawns, American flags, corn fields and factories. It was packed with swing state and Midwestern governors and senators who spoke in glowing terms of Mr. Obama; a brigadier general, now retired, vouched for his national security credentials.
At the heart of the program were the stories of four everyday families of different backgrounds who told stories of lost health care benefits, the necessities of food rationing and the need to hold more than one job. Mr. Obama told how his mother had to worry about whether the health care provider at her new job would cover her as she battled ovarian cancer. And he retold his background as the grandson of a man who fought in “Patton’s Army” and a grandmother who worked on a bomber assembly line in World War II.
But for much of the program Mr. Obama stood before a presidential desk as he laid out his tax plans, health care plans and his approach to world affairs, saying that, as commander in chief, “I’ll renew the tough, direct diplomacy that can prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and curb Russian aggression.”
In somewhat jarring fashion, the infomercial ended with Mr. Obama addressing an auditorium audience in Florida, live.
ANALYSIS As in his speech in Berlin and his stadium nomination speech last summer, Mr. Obama’s campaign was again practicing its brand of big-event politics with this infomercial: Taking over a huge chunk of the television dial in an effort to make a closing sale with an audience that was likely to be well into the millions. And like the gambits before it, the advertisement held risks just by definition of what it was: A giant financial outlay that made Mr. Obama almost unavoidable to television viewers who are by now weary from all these many months of politicking.
Because Mr. Obama is already running the most intensive and wide-ranging presidential advertising campaign in history, with electronic billboards for his candidacy showing up even in home video games, it raised the obvious question, “How much is too much?” With a heavy-handed style of filmmaking devised to pull at heart strings as Mr. Obama ticked through the commercial’s hard-luck stories, it risked seeming manipulative.
(Senator John McCain’s campaign wasted no time in issuing a statement that read: “As anyone who has bought anything from an infomercial knows, the sales-job is always better than the product. Buyer beware.”)
But at other times, the infomercial appeared to serve perhaps a safer, workmanlike purpose. With no attacks on Mr. McCain or his running mate, it was largely in keeping with Mr. Obama’s strategic imperative this year: Make voters comfortable with the idea of him in the Oval Office while at the same time presenting him as a candidate who can connect with everyday, middle-class voters struggling through the toughest economic times in generations.
It would seem a fool’s errand to score the success of the program immediately after it was shown. First impressions this year have at times proved to have short shelf lives, especially those shared in the news media.
The New York Times Politics Blog
Friday, October 24, 2008
Threat of Religious Freedom
By Rumadi
Religious freedom in Indonesia is now under serious threat. On one hand we see a strong wave of Islamization as manifested by the formalization of Islamic law in several regions. On the other, we have witnessed discriminatory acts against groups that practice religious forms of expression outside of the mainstream. The latter cases are a serious violation of human rights and threaten the very foundations of the nation.
The attack on the Ahmadiyah complex in Parung, Bogor, West Java, by a hard-line Islamic group represents a serious threat to religious freedoms in this country. This violence is not the first to be experienced by Ahmadiyah followers. Before that, Ahmadiyah followers in West Nusatenggara and Kuningan, West Java, also suffered similar experiences. Their mosques were attacked and they suffered violence, both physical and mental.
The attack on Ahmadiyah is the most recent example of a growing intolerance of anything judged to be outside orthodox Islam and it is unlikely to be the last. In fact if we view events in recent months, the attack was part of a series of bigoted acts sanctioned by clerics here that all had a similar root; the persecution of those it was ruled had committed blasphemy.
A few months ago the rock band Dewa suffered a similar chastisement. The group was accused of undermining a symbol God and spreading more wrongs through its lyrics.
Accusations of blasphemy were also directed at an Islamic group, the Ngaji Lelaku community, who used two languages (Arabic and Indonesian) in the sholat prayer. That group was based in Malang and was led by imam Yusman Roy.
Roy who was only trying to teach his followers a good way of praying was arrested and was charged with committing blasphemy. His use of the two languages in the sholat was considered a criminal act.
A few weeks after Roy was brought to jail, another case involving blasphemy accusations occurred in Probolinggo, East Java. This time it was the ideas coming from a drug counselor at the Cancer and Drugs Rehabilitation Center. Thousands of people ransacked the complex because of what had been written in a book aiming to help addicts, “From Darkness toward Brightness”. Foundation head Ardhi Hussain and some of his assistants were arrested and his foundation was closed.
His followers, including small children were evicted from their premises and are now virtual refugees. The children were also accused of blasphemy and shunned – this is how the “sins” of the parents are visited on the children.
Because incidents involving blasphemy accusations are frequently occurring, one can strongly suspect that they are not spontaneous or unlinked. There is a grand plan behind them and those who are drawing up the scenario have so far fired their arrows at clear targets. I strongly believe that progressive Islamic groups will be the next targets.
If progressive Islam is attacked, the religious freedoms that are guaranteed in the Constitution will again be seriously threatened. However, the government seems hesitant to protect these religious freedoms. This can be seen from the hands-off way the state has dealt with these cases. The government and the security forces did not prevent attacks against places used by groups accused of committing blasphemy; their lack of action serving as an implicit approval.
This reality is in contrast with article 28 (e) of the Constitution which states (1) every citizen has the right to hold religious beliefs and pray according these beliefs, choose their education and form of teaching, choose their job, choose their citizenship, live in this country, leave and return to the country; (2) every citizen has the right to hold personal beliefs and express their thoughts and attitudes according to what they believe is right.
The article is in line with article 22 of the human rights Law No. 39/1999 which states: (1) Every citizen has the right to practice a religion and perform prayers according to their religion and beliefs; (2) The state shall guarantee the freedom of the citizen to believe in a religion and to practice their beliefs.
Article 8 of the law states: “Protection, development, enforcement, and fulfillment of the rights are the obligation of the government.
Under the law the government can not escape responsibility of protecting and guarantying religious freedoms; not only the freedom to hold a religion but also the freedom to practice it.
Therefore, the government must act firmly against all those that transgress this principle, because the action is not only a criminal action but also is a violation of the Constitution.
By taking firm action the public will consider that government has a commitment to safeguarding the Constitution and human rights principles.
In all cases of violence against religious groups, there has been the involvement of the Indonesian Council of Ulema (MUI). MUI has acted as if it holds supreme authority over religious matters. Sadly, the government has seemed to follow the ruling of the MUI and acted as if it did not have any interest in the fatwa issued by MUI.
The government must follow the Constitution and protect religious freedoms and the freedoms of people to practice their beliefs. At the same time it must take action against all those who violate the Constitution. Religious organizations like MUI must also follow the Constitution. They must not act as if they are the sole authority on religious affairs. MUI must become an organization of ulema that does not act against the Constitution. ***
The Writer is Lecturer in Faculty of Islamic Law UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Researcher The Wahid Institute Jakarta.
© 2005, GusDur.Net, All Rights Reserved
Tuesday, October 21, 2008
Forget oil, the new global crisis is food
Alia McMullen, Financial Post Published: Monday, January 07, 2008
A new crisis is emerging, a global food catastrophe that will reach further and be more crippling than anything the world has ever seen. The credit crunch and the reverberations of soaring oil prices around the world will pale in comparison to what is about to transpire, Donald Coxe, global portfolio strategist at BMO Financial Group said at the Empire Club's 14th annual investment outlook in Toronto on Thursday.
"It's not a matter of if, but when," he warned investors. "It's going to hit this year hard."
Mr. Coxe said the sharp rise in raw food prices in the past year will intensify in the next few years amid increased demand for meat and dairy products from the growing middle classes of countries such as China and India as well as heavy demand from the biofuels industry.
"The greatest challenge to the world is not US$100 oil; it's getting enough food so that the new middle class can eat the way our middle class does, and that means we've got to expand food output dramatically," he said.
The impact of tighter food supply is already evident in raw food prices, which have risen 22% in the past year.
Mr. Coxe said in an interview that this surge would begin to show in the prices of consumer foods in the next six months. Consumers already paid 6.5% more for food in the past year.
Wheat prices alone have risen 92% in the past year, and yesterday closed at US$9.45 a bushel on the Chicago Board of Trade.
At the centre of the imminent food catastrophe is corn - the main staple of the ethanol industry. The price of corn has risen about 44% over the past 15 months, closing at US$4.66 a bushel on the CBOT yesterday - its best finish since June 1996.
This not only impacts the price of food products made using grains, but also the price of meat, with feed prices for livestock also increasing.
"You're going to have real problems in countries that are food short, because we're already getting embargoes on food exports from countries, who were trying desperately to sell their stuff before, but now they're embargoing exports," he said, citing Russia and India as examples.
"Those who have food are going to have a big edge."
With 54% of the world's corn supply grown in America's mid-west, the U.S. is one of those countries with an edge.
But Mr. Coxe warned U.S. corn exports were in danger of seizing up in about three years if the country continues to subsidize ethanol production. Biofuels are expected to eat up about a third of America's grain harvest in 2007.
The amount of U.S. grain currently stored for following seasons was the lowest on record, relative to consumption, he said.
"You should be there for it fully-hedged by having access to those stocks that benefit from rising food prices."
He said there are about two dozen stocks in the world that are going to redefine the world's food supplies, and "those stocks will have a precious value as we move forward."
Mr. Coxe said crop yields around the world need to increase to something close to what is achieved in the state of Illinois, which produces over 200 corn bushes an acre compared with an average 30 bushes an acre in the rest of the world.
"That will be done with more fertilizer, with genetically modified seeds, and with advanced machinery and technology," he said.
READ MORE - Forget oil, the new global crisis is food
A new crisis is emerging, a global food catastrophe that will reach further and be more crippling than anything the world has ever seen. The credit crunch and the reverberations of soaring oil prices around the world will pale in comparison to what is about to transpire, Donald Coxe, global portfolio strategist at BMO Financial Group said at the Empire Club's 14th annual investment outlook in Toronto on Thursday.
"It's not a matter of if, but when," he warned investors. "It's going to hit this year hard."
Mr. Coxe said the sharp rise in raw food prices in the past year will intensify in the next few years amid increased demand for meat and dairy products from the growing middle classes of countries such as China and India as well as heavy demand from the biofuels industry.
"The greatest challenge to the world is not US$100 oil; it's getting enough food so that the new middle class can eat the way our middle class does, and that means we've got to expand food output dramatically," he said.
The impact of tighter food supply is already evident in raw food prices, which have risen 22% in the past year.
Mr. Coxe said in an interview that this surge would begin to show in the prices of consumer foods in the next six months. Consumers already paid 6.5% more for food in the past year.
Wheat prices alone have risen 92% in the past year, and yesterday closed at US$9.45 a bushel on the Chicago Board of Trade.
At the centre of the imminent food catastrophe is corn - the main staple of the ethanol industry. The price of corn has risen about 44% over the past 15 months, closing at US$4.66 a bushel on the CBOT yesterday - its best finish since June 1996.
This not only impacts the price of food products made using grains, but also the price of meat, with feed prices for livestock also increasing.
"You're going to have real problems in countries that are food short, because we're already getting embargoes on food exports from countries, who were trying desperately to sell their stuff before, but now they're embargoing exports," he said, citing Russia and India as examples.
"Those who have food are going to have a big edge."
With 54% of the world's corn supply grown in America's mid-west, the U.S. is one of those countries with an edge.
But Mr. Coxe warned U.S. corn exports were in danger of seizing up in about three years if the country continues to subsidize ethanol production. Biofuels are expected to eat up about a third of America's grain harvest in 2007.
The amount of U.S. grain currently stored for following seasons was the lowest on record, relative to consumption, he said.
"You should be there for it fully-hedged by having access to those stocks that benefit from rising food prices."
He said there are about two dozen stocks in the world that are going to redefine the world's food supplies, and "those stocks will have a precious value as we move forward."
Mr. Coxe said crop yields around the world need to increase to something close to what is achieved in the state of Illinois, which produces over 200 corn bushes an acre compared with an average 30 bushes an acre in the rest of the world.
"That will be done with more fertilizer, with genetically modified seeds, and with advanced machinery and technology," he said.
Friday, September 19, 2008
LANGGAM SAJAK
Hai Ma
WS. Rendra
Maa
Bukan maut yang menggetarkan hatiku
Tetapi hidup yang tidak hidup karena kehilangan daya dan kehilangan fitrahnya
Ada malam-malam panjang aku menyusuri lorong panjang tanpa tujuan kemana-mana
Hawa dingin masuk ke badanku yang hampa padahal angin tidak ada
Bintang-bintang menjadi kunang-kunang yang lebih menekankan hadirnya kegelapan
Tidak ada pikiran tidaka ada perasaan tidak ada suatu apa
Hidup memang fana Ma
Tetapi keadaan takberdaya membuat diriku tidak ada
Kadang-kadang aku merasa terbang ke belantara dijauhi ayah bunda
Dan ditolak para tetangga atau aku terlantar di pasar aku berbicara tetapi orang-orang tidak mendengar
Mereka merobek-robek buku dan mentertawakan cita-cita
Aku marah aku takut aku gemetar namun gagal menyusun bahasa
Hidup memang fana Ma
Itu gampang aku terima tetaapi duduk menekuk lutut sendirian di sabana membuat hidupku tak ada harganya
Kadang-kadang aku merasa ditarik-tarik orang kesana kemari mulut berbusa sekedar karena tertawa hidup cemar karena basa-basi dan orang-orang mengisi waktu dengan pertengkaran edan yang tanpa persoalan atau percintaan tanpa asmara dan senggama yang tidak selesai
Hidup memang fana tentu saja Ma
Tetapi akrobat pemikiran dan kepalsuan yang dikelola mengacaukan isi perutku lalu mendorong aku menjerit-jerit sambil tertawa kenapa
Rasanya setelah mati berpulangkan takada lagi yang mengagetkan di dalan hidup ini
Tetapi Ma setiap kali menyadari adanya kamu di dalm hidupku ini aku merasa jalanya arus darah di sekujur tubuhku kelenjar-kelenjarku bekerja sukmaku menyanyi dunia hadir cicak di tembok berbunyi tukang kebun kedengaran berbicara kepada putranya hidup menjadi nyata fitrahku kembali
Mengingat kamu Ma adalah mengingat kuwajiban sehari-hari
keserhanaan bahasa prosa keindahan puisi-puisi
kita selalu asyik bertukar pikiran ya mak masing-masing pihak punya cita-cita masing-masing pihak punya kuwajiban yang nyata
Hai Ma apakah kamu ingat aku peluk kamu diatas prahu ketika kamu sakit dan aku tenangkan kamu dengan ciuman-ciuman di lehermu
Masya Allah aku selalu kesengsem pada bau kulitmu imgatkah waaktu itu aku berkata kiamat boleh tiba hidupku penuh makna haahaa
wah aku memang tidak rugi ketemu kamu di hidup ini dan apabila aku menulis sajak aku juga merasa bahwa kemarin dan esok adalah hari ini bencana dan keberuntumgan sama saja langit di luar langit di badan bersatu dalam jiwa sudah ya Ma.
Sebuah sajak yang sarat makna dari si burung merak
"Bukan maut yang menggetarkan hatiku
Tetapi hidup yang tidak hidup karena kehilangan daya dan kehilangan fitrahnya "
Karena maut dan kematian adalah keniscayaan dan tidak bisa ditawar, tidak ada alasan sebenarnya untuk takut dan tergetar hati kita oleh maut dan kematian itu sendiri, namun yang patut kita takuti adalah "hidup yang tidak hidup, karena kehilangan daya dan kehilangan fitrahnya". jika manusia hidup tanpa memiliki daya kekuatan dan kefitraan apakah masih bisa disebut hidup. sebagai mahluq sosial manusia dituntut untuk mampu saling bantu sesama manusia kemampuan untuk saling bantu inilah barangkali yang dimaksud oleh WS. Rendra dengan "daya" yang membuat hidup manusia punya makna.
Sejak dilahirkan di dunia manusia sesungguhnya dalam keadaan fitrah laksana kertas putih bersih tanpa noda namun dari upaya memenuhi kebutuhan hidupnya mulai dari kebutuhan terhadap makanan, minuman sampai kebutuhan terhadap hubungan lawan jenis dan kekuasaan seringkali kefitraan itu ternoda bahkan nyaris hilang oelh tindakan semacam pencurian, perzinahan, memfitnah bahkan korupsi uang negara. manusia yang telah kehilangan fitrahnya seperti ini apakah masih layak disebut hidup.
Dalam bulan Ramadan yang suci ini marilah kita bersama kembali kita raih kehidupan yang benar-benar hidup dengan mengembalikan kembali daya dan kefitraan kita melalui ibadah puasa dan peduli terhadap sesama dalam bentuk apapun yang tentunya dapat bermanfaat bagi orang lain.
Wednesday, September 3, 2008
Iman, Hati dan Akal
Hakikat keimanan adalah Taqwa karena iman memberikan makna mempercayai dalam hati dan mengamalkan dalam setiap perbuatan. Dan pengamalan dalam perbuatan inilah yang tentunya berwujud ketaqwaan.yang berarti melaksanakan segala perintah-Nya dan menjauhi segala larangan-Nya.
Menjadi persoalan yang sering diri kita hadapi adalah sejauh mana kekuatanh iman kita, karena posisi iman pertama kali bersemayam di hati, maka sudah pasti kadar iman kita akan sangat dipengaruhi oleh sejauh mana pengalaman-pengalaman hidup yang membekas di dalam hati kita, pengalaman hidup seseorang tentu sangat beragam dan kadang sangat ekstrim ada orang yang mendapatkan pengalaman hidupnya yang serba kekurangan bahkan untuk memenuhi kebutuhan pokok sekalipun, namun ada juga orang yang menjalani hidupnya yang sangat berlimpah secara materi, ada orang yang pengalaman hidupnya didominasi oleh tubuh yang sakit berkepanjangan, namun ada juga orang yang hidupnya sehat-sehat saja. Pengalaman-pengalaman hidup semacam ini jelas membekas dan menggurat dalam hati dan tentu sangat berpengaruh terhadap bagaimana seseorang mengimani Tuhanya.
Dari dua kecenderungan pengalaman hidup manusia ini akan mengahasilkan manusia yang beriman dan manusia yang ingkar atau kufur. Mereka yang beriman jelasnya adalah mereka yang mampu menangkap pengalaman hidupnya secara positif dan yang ingkar adalah mereka yang memaknai pengalaman hidupnya secara negative..
Yang sangat Istimewa adalah ada orang-orang yang meskipun dalam pengalaman hidupnya dihantam dan tercampakkan kedalam kondisi yang kuarang beruntung, namun iman mereka nyaris tidak berubah, bahkan semakin menguat meskipun terkadang sering terjadi pertentangan antara akal dan hati mereka, namun kembali sang hati memenanginya dan mereka menjadi hamba yang mukmin dan muttaqien. Lalu kekuatan apa sebenarnya yang mampu membuat mereka bertahan, jawabanya adalah kekuatan iman itu sendiri karena iman memang berada di dalam hati dan kadang memang tidak memiliki penjelasan yang dapat dengan mudah diterima oleh akal.
Thursday, August 21, 2008
TULODO
Maulana Syekh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani al-Haqqani ar-Rabbani q.s.
Syekh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani q.s. adalah seorang ulama dan syekh sufi yang berasal dari Lebanon. Beliau lulusan American University di Beirut dalam bidang kimia. Dari sana beliau melanjutkan studi kedokteran di University of Louvain, Belgia. Beliau juga meraih gelar di bidang Hukum Islam dari Universitas al-Azhar, Damaskus. Sejak usia 15 tahun, beliau telah menemani Syekh `Abdullah ad-Daghestani q.s. dan Syekh Muhammad Nazim al-Haqqani q.s., syekh agung Tarekat Naqsybandi yang mulia di masa ini. Beliau banyak melakukan perjalanan ke segala penjuru di Timur Tengah, Eropa, dan Timur Jauh untuk menemani syekhnya.
Pada tahun 1991 beliau diperintahkan syekhnya untuk pindah ke Amerika dan mendirikan yayasan bagi Tarekat Naqsybandi di sana. Sejak saat itu, beliau telah membuka 13 pusat sufi di Kanada dan Amerika Serikat. Beliau telah mengajar di sejumlah universitas, seperti: the University of Chicago, Columbia University, Howard, Berkeley, McGill, Concordia, dan Dawson College, demikian pula dengan sejumlah pusat keagamaan dan spiritual di seluruh Amerika Utara, Eropa, Timur Jauh dan Timur Tengah.
Misi dari Syekh Hisham Kabbani q.s. di benua Amerika adalah untuk menyebarkan ajaran sufi dalam konteks persaudaraan umat manusia dan kesatuan dalam kepercayaan kepada Tuhan yang terdapat dalam semua agama dan jalur spiritual. Usahanya diarahkan untuk membawa spektrum keagamaan dan jalur-jalur spiritual yang beragam ke dalam keharmonisan dan kerukunan, dalam rangka pengenalan akan kewajiban ummat manusia sebagai kalifah Tuhan di bumi ini.
Sebagai seorang syekh sufi, Syekh Hisham q.s. telah diberi wewenang untuk membimbing para pengikutnya menuju Cinta Ilahi dan menuju tingkatan spiritual yang telah digariskan Sang Pencipta. Latihan spiritual yang berat yang telah ditempuhnya selama 40 tahun di bawah pengawasan syekh besar dan syekhnya, telah menganugerahinya kecakapan yang tinggi mencakup kebijaksanaan, cahaya ilahiah, intelektual yang diperlukan seorang guru sufi sejati.
Misi Syekh Hisham q.s. yang jauh melampaui target di Amerika adalah kontribusinya yang unik terhadap usaha umat manusia dalam mencapai takdir tertingginya, yaitu kedekatan dengan Tuhannya. Usaha beliau untuk membawa kesatuan hati dalam gerakannya menuju Inti Ilahi merupakan warisan terbesarnya kepada dunia Barat.
Syekh Hisham q.s. adalah keturunan Rasulullah saw. baik dari jalur Ayah dan Ibunya (al-Hasani al-Husayni). Dari istrinya, Hj. Nazihe Adil yang merupakan putri Syekh Nazim al-Haqqani q.s., beliau dikaruniai 3 putra dan 1 putri, serta beberapa cucu yang semuanya menetap di Fenton, Michigan.
Beberapa posisi yang beliau duduki di Amerika saat ini antara lain: Ketua Islamic Supreme Council of America (ISCA), penasihat dalam Unity One, yaitu sebuah organisasi yang ditujukan untuk perdamaian antar-gang di Amerika, penasihat dalam Human Rights Council, penasihat dalam American Islamic Association of Mental Health Providers dan penasihat dalam Office of Religious Persecution, US Department of State.
Beberapa tulisannya yang telah dipublikasikan secara internasional antara lain: Classical Islam and the Naqshbandi Sufi Tradition, Naqshbandi Sufi Way: the Story of Golden Chain, Angels Unveiled-Sufi Perspective (edisi Indonesia: Dialog dengan para Malaikat, diterbitkan Hikmah), Pearls and Coral, Encyclopedia of Islamic Doctrine (7 volume), The Permissibility of Mawlid, “Salafi” Movement Unveiled, dan The Approach of Armageddon? (edisi Indonesia: Kiamat Mendekat, diterbitkan Serambi).
Sejak tahun 1997, beliau telah beberapa kali berkunjung ke Indonesia dan sekarang telah memiliki ribuan murid yang tersebar di pelosok Jakarta, Sukabumi, Bandung, Pekalongan, Semarang, Tuban, Surabaya, Batam, Aceh, Padang, Bukittinggi, Bali dan lain-lain, yang semuanya terwadah dalam suatu keluarga besar Jemaah Tarekat Naqsybandi al-Haqqaniyah yang dalam keorganisasiannya dikelola Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia.
Hak cipta © 2006–2008 Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia.Email webmaster.
Friday, August 15, 2008
Jalan Baru Fajar Kemakmuran Bangsa?
Ada sebuah pertanyaan yang sangat penting yang akan sulit untuk kita jawab terkait dengan kondisi bangsa kita hari ini. Pertanyaan tersebut adalah mengapa setelah kemerdekaan politik 17 Agustus 1945 dan setelah terbukanya kebebasan politik Mei 1998, Indonesia tidak pernah bangkit dan tidak pernah mampu meningkatkan kesejahteraan rakyat ?
Pada pertengahan tahun 1960-an, GNP perkapita Indonesia, Malaysia dan Taiwan, nyaris sama, yaitu kurang dari US$ 100 per kapita. China bahkan jauh lebih rendah sekitar US$ 50 per kapita. Tetapi pada tahun 2005, GNP per kapita Indonesia hanya sekitar US$ 1.260. sementara Malaysia 4 kali kita, Korea selatan 13 kali kita, Thailand 2 kali kita, Taiwan 12 kali kita dan bahkan China telah menjadi 14 kali kita. Selama 40 tahun terakhir, Indonesia paling tertinggal dibandingkan dengan negara-negara Asia lainya. Saat ini negara-negara Asia Timur tersebut sudah semakin meninggalkan kita. Kita terpaksa bersaing dengan negara-negara seperti Vietnam, Filipina dan Pakistan. Sungguh negri ini telah sedemikian terpuruk dan bingung mencari jawaban bagaimana harus bangkit dari keterpurukan tersebut.
Penyebab utama mengapa Indonesia tidak pernah bangkit, walaupun telah memiliki kemerdekaan dan kebebasan politik, adalah karakter feodal dari para pemimpin. Para pemimpin kebanyakan berasal dari kalangan Priyayi, tradisional maupun moderen yang merasa tidak memiliki kuwajiban untuk meningkatkan kesejahteraan rakyat. Dalam sistem feodal atau neofeodalisme, kekuasaan berasal dari hubungan biologis dan romantisme historis serta legimasi pencitraan semu, di mana rakyat hanya diperlukan pada saat Pemilu dan sekedar penggembira. Dalam budaya feodal atau neo-feodalisme ini pemimpin tidak memiliki kewajiban sakral, tidak memiliki noblesse oblige dan tidak memiliki semangat bushido untuk berjuang dan berkorban demi meningkatkan kesejahteraan rakyat dan kemajuan bangsanya. Di negara-negara yang maju di Asia Timur, para pemimpinya memiliki kewajiban sakral dan semangat bushido untuk meningkatkan kesejahteraan rakyatnya, baik karena alasan ideologis (China), semangat nasionalisme dan kemandirian (Jepang dan Malaysia) dan alasan survival (Singapura, Korea dan Taiwan).
Alasan kedua, mengapa Indonesia tidak mampu meningkatkan kesejahteraan mayoritas rakyatnya adalah karena adanya the creeping back of neocolonialism atau kembalinya neokolonialisme. Para pejuang kemerdekaan kita sejak tahun 1908 dan para pendiri Republik Indonesia berjuang dan berkorban melawan berbagai bentuk imperealisme dan kolonialisme. Bung Karno dalam pidatonya di Pengadilan Negri Bandung tahun 1930 “ Indonesia Menggugat” dan Bung Hatta dalam bukunya “Indonisia Vrij” secara sangat jelas dan rinci menjelaskan bahaya dan kerusakan yang diakibatkan oleh sistem imperealisme dan kolonialisme.
Pada saat konferensi meja bundar 1949, Soekarno-Hatta menyetujui pembayaran utang Hindia Belanda oleh Indonesia, asalkan Belanda mengakui kemerdekaan Indonesia, tetapi persetujuan itu hanya taktik, dalam kenyataanya Pemerintahan Soekarno-Hatta tidak pernah melaksanakan pembayaran utang tersebut karena bertolak belakang dengan prinsip keadilan.
Namun yang disayangkan setelah Soekarno jatuh, Pemerintah Orde Baru melalui Mafia Berkeley melakukan negosiasi ulang tentang utang-utang Indonesia pada tahun 1969. mereka sepakat untuk mencicil utang warisan Pemerintah Hindia Belanda. Artinya mereka sepakat untuk membayar biaya penjajahan pemerintah Hindia Belanda, membayar biaya penindasan kepada rakyat Indonesia.
Sejak saat itulah, tidak peduli siapapun Presidennya, siapa partai yang berkuasa, Mafia Ekonom Orde Baru dengan sengaja mendesain kebijakan Indonesia sekedar hanya menjadi subordinasi dan alat dari kepentingan internasional. Itulah yang kami sebut sebagai neokolonialisme.
Penyebab ketiga mengapa Indonesia tidak mampu meningkatkan kesejahteraan rakyatnya adalah Kepemimpinan yang lemah dan tidak efektif. Kepemimpinan yang lemah dan tidak efektif tersebut adalah cerminan dari visi dan karakter yang lemah, sehingga mudah goyang hanya karena adanya perubahan kepentingan taktis, perubahan opini, dan respon pencitraan situasional.
Pertanyaan berikutnya ialah, masihkah ada harapan untuk meningkatkan kesejahteraan mayoritas rakyat kita dan membawa Indonesia menjadi salah satu negara besar di Asia. Dibutuhkan “Jalan Baru” untuk kembali membawa Indonesia bangkit dari keterpurukan. Berangkat dari amanat realitas diatas maka terlahirlah Komite Bangkit Indonesia yang akan memperjuangkan “Jalan Baru”, jalan anti neokolonialisme, jalan yang lebih mandiri yang akan membawa kesejahteraan dan kemakmuran mayoritas rakyat Indonesia.
Dengan sebuah tekad bulat mari kita hapuskansegala bentuk neokolonialisme dari bumi Indonesia! Tinggalkan “jalan lama”, yang gagal membawa kemakmuran dan kesejahteraan! Kita rebut kembali kedaulatan politik dan ekonomi ! Hanya dengan jalan baru, kemakmuran dan kesejahteraan akan kita capai!, Hanya dengan “jalan baru”, Indonesia akan segera bangkit !
Pada pertengahan tahun 1960-an, GNP perkapita Indonesia, Malaysia dan Taiwan, nyaris sama, yaitu kurang dari US$ 100 per kapita. China bahkan jauh lebih rendah sekitar US$ 50 per kapita. Tetapi pada tahun 2005, GNP per kapita Indonesia hanya sekitar US$ 1.260. sementara Malaysia 4 kali kita, Korea selatan 13 kali kita, Thailand 2 kali kita, Taiwan 12 kali kita dan bahkan China telah menjadi 14 kali kita. Selama 40 tahun terakhir, Indonesia paling tertinggal dibandingkan dengan negara-negara Asia lainya. Saat ini negara-negara Asia Timur tersebut sudah semakin meninggalkan kita. Kita terpaksa bersaing dengan negara-negara seperti Vietnam, Filipina dan Pakistan. Sungguh negri ini telah sedemikian terpuruk dan bingung mencari jawaban bagaimana harus bangkit dari keterpurukan tersebut.
Penyebab utama mengapa Indonesia tidak pernah bangkit, walaupun telah memiliki kemerdekaan dan kebebasan politik, adalah karakter feodal dari para pemimpin. Para pemimpin kebanyakan berasal dari kalangan Priyayi, tradisional maupun moderen yang merasa tidak memiliki kuwajiban untuk meningkatkan kesejahteraan rakyat. Dalam sistem feodal atau neofeodalisme, kekuasaan berasal dari hubungan biologis dan romantisme historis serta legimasi pencitraan semu, di mana rakyat hanya diperlukan pada saat Pemilu dan sekedar penggembira. Dalam budaya feodal atau neo-feodalisme ini pemimpin tidak memiliki kewajiban sakral, tidak memiliki noblesse oblige dan tidak memiliki semangat bushido untuk berjuang dan berkorban demi meningkatkan kesejahteraan rakyat dan kemajuan bangsanya. Di negara-negara yang maju di Asia Timur, para pemimpinya memiliki kewajiban sakral dan semangat bushido untuk meningkatkan kesejahteraan rakyatnya, baik karena alasan ideologis (China), semangat nasionalisme dan kemandirian (Jepang dan Malaysia) dan alasan survival (Singapura, Korea dan Taiwan).
Alasan kedua, mengapa Indonesia tidak mampu meningkatkan kesejahteraan mayoritas rakyatnya adalah karena adanya the creeping back of neocolonialism atau kembalinya neokolonialisme. Para pejuang kemerdekaan kita sejak tahun 1908 dan para pendiri Republik Indonesia berjuang dan berkorban melawan berbagai bentuk imperealisme dan kolonialisme. Bung Karno dalam pidatonya di Pengadilan Negri Bandung tahun 1930 “ Indonesia Menggugat” dan Bung Hatta dalam bukunya “Indonisia Vrij” secara sangat jelas dan rinci menjelaskan bahaya dan kerusakan yang diakibatkan oleh sistem imperealisme dan kolonialisme.
Pada saat konferensi meja bundar 1949, Soekarno-Hatta menyetujui pembayaran utang Hindia Belanda oleh Indonesia, asalkan Belanda mengakui kemerdekaan Indonesia, tetapi persetujuan itu hanya taktik, dalam kenyataanya Pemerintahan Soekarno-Hatta tidak pernah melaksanakan pembayaran utang tersebut karena bertolak belakang dengan prinsip keadilan.
Namun yang disayangkan setelah Soekarno jatuh, Pemerintah Orde Baru melalui Mafia Berkeley melakukan negosiasi ulang tentang utang-utang Indonesia pada tahun 1969. mereka sepakat untuk mencicil utang warisan Pemerintah Hindia Belanda. Artinya mereka sepakat untuk membayar biaya penjajahan pemerintah Hindia Belanda, membayar biaya penindasan kepada rakyat Indonesia.
Sejak saat itulah, tidak peduli siapapun Presidennya, siapa partai yang berkuasa, Mafia Ekonom Orde Baru dengan sengaja mendesain kebijakan Indonesia sekedar hanya menjadi subordinasi dan alat dari kepentingan internasional. Itulah yang kami sebut sebagai neokolonialisme.
Penyebab ketiga mengapa Indonesia tidak mampu meningkatkan kesejahteraan rakyatnya adalah Kepemimpinan yang lemah dan tidak efektif. Kepemimpinan yang lemah dan tidak efektif tersebut adalah cerminan dari visi dan karakter yang lemah, sehingga mudah goyang hanya karena adanya perubahan kepentingan taktis, perubahan opini, dan respon pencitraan situasional.
Pertanyaan berikutnya ialah, masihkah ada harapan untuk meningkatkan kesejahteraan mayoritas rakyat kita dan membawa Indonesia menjadi salah satu negara besar di Asia. Dibutuhkan “Jalan Baru” untuk kembali membawa Indonesia bangkit dari keterpurukan. Berangkat dari amanat realitas diatas maka terlahirlah Komite Bangkit Indonesia yang akan memperjuangkan “Jalan Baru”, jalan anti neokolonialisme, jalan yang lebih mandiri yang akan membawa kesejahteraan dan kemakmuran mayoritas rakyat Indonesia.
Dengan sebuah tekad bulat mari kita hapuskansegala bentuk neokolonialisme dari bumi Indonesia! Tinggalkan “jalan lama”, yang gagal membawa kemakmuran dan kesejahteraan! Kita rebut kembali kedaulatan politik dan ekonomi ! Hanya dengan jalan baru, kemakmuran dan kesejahteraan akan kita capai!, Hanya dengan “jalan baru”, Indonesia akan segera bangkit !
Tuesday, August 5, 2008
Roadmap Gerakan Mahsiswa
Tidak menarik lagi rasanya jika hari ini kita tetap saja larut dalam romantisme gerakan mahasiswa 98, karena telah semakin kelihatan bahwa apa yang terjadi pada 98 bukan design genuine gerakan mahasiswa itu sendiri, invisiblehand-invisiblehand yang lebih kuat mengkondisikan reformasi 98 hari ini semakin terlihat jelas.
Gerakan mahasiswa saat ini harus cepat menemukan kedirianya yang semakin susah dibangun karena terpaan badai pragmatisme yang datang seiring proses transisi demokrasi negri ini yang nampak berjalan terseok-seok di ujung lidah neoliberalisme. kalau tidak dilakukan bukan tidak mungkin gerakan mahasiswa hanya akan menjadi buruh outsourcing di pabrik-pabrik petualang politik komprador neoliberalisme dan neokolonialisme.
Gerakan mahasiswa harus segera menemukan roadmap atau peta jalan baru yang mampu membawa dirinya menjadi kekuatan penyeimbang atau bahkan penakluk dari kekuatan-kekuatan komprador-komprador neoliberalisme dan neokolonialisme yang akan membawa negri ini menjadi layamut walaa yahya (tidak hidup namun juga bukan mati).
hidup mahasiswa!!
hidup mahasiswa!!
Gerakan mahasiswa saat ini harus cepat menemukan kedirianya yang semakin susah dibangun karena terpaan badai pragmatisme yang datang seiring proses transisi demokrasi negri ini yang nampak berjalan terseok-seok di ujung lidah neoliberalisme. kalau tidak dilakukan bukan tidak mungkin gerakan mahasiswa hanya akan menjadi buruh outsourcing di pabrik-pabrik petualang politik komprador neoliberalisme dan neokolonialisme.
Gerakan mahasiswa harus segera menemukan roadmap atau peta jalan baru yang mampu membawa dirinya menjadi kekuatan penyeimbang atau bahkan penakluk dari kekuatan-kekuatan komprador-komprador neoliberalisme dan neokolonialisme yang akan membawa negri ini menjadi layamut walaa yahya (tidak hidup namun juga bukan mati).
hidup mahasiswa!!
hidup mahasiswa!!
Thursday, June 12, 2008
FPI dan Penodaan Citra Agama
Oleh Gugun El-Guyanie
Tindakan brutal dengan mengibarkan bendera Islam itu justru melukai sejumlah tokoh Islam yang bergabung dalam AKKBB. Aksi kekerasan yang dilakukan oleh FPI itu adalah untuk kesekian, setelah berulang kali merusak dan menyerang kelompok yang tidak sependapat dengan mereka. Wajar jika banyak tuntutan dari organisasi kemasyarakatan (ormas) lain yang moderat, menuntut pemerintah untuk membubarkan FPI. Beragama dengan
Nilai-nilai Pancasila yang secara jelas mendasarkan kepada semua ritme kehidupan berbangsa berdasarkan Ketuhanan telah ternodai. Terlebih agama Islam yang mengajarkan cinta untuk semesta (rahmatan lil ’alamin).
Kelompok-kelompok yang berbaju agama namun berlaku layaknya preman itu sebenarnya telah menentang Tuhan. Mereka sebenarnya tidak menyembah Tuhan, tetapi menyembah kesombongan kelompoknya yang seolah perkasa, paling kuat, dan paling benar. Aksi-aksi yang dilakukannya jelas berlawanan dengan nilai-nilai kemanusiaan, karena melukai dan menghujat kelompok lain dengan biadab.
Tipologi kelompok itu sangat mengancam semangat persatuan nasional. Berpolitik mereka adalah berpolitik
Menodai Pancasila
Spirit kelima sila dalam Pancasila, telah dirusak semua. Secara gamblang, mereka sudah berusaha menodai Pancasila dengan tetap bersikukuh bahwa tindakannya adalah berdasarkan kepada legitimasi dari agama.
Pancasila telah menjamin kebebasan setiap kelompok untuk berkeyakinan, termasuk menjamin FPI hidup di bumi
Dengan demikian, harus ada tindakan yang tegas dari negara untuk menindak kelompok-kelompok preman, kendatipun sumpah serapah ingin menegakkan syariat Islam.
Tidak ada syariat Islam di dunia ini yang mengajarkan kekerasan dan menganggap kelompoknya sendiri yang paling benar. Dengan anarkisme dan brutalisme FPI, Tuhan tidak akan ternoda, tapi yang ternoda adalah makhluk Tuhan yang disyariatkan untuk hidup cinta damai di belahan bumi mana pun. Kebesaran Tuhan tidak akan terkurangi karena ulah FPI; kesucian Tuhan tidak akan ternodai; dan kemahakuasaan Tuhan juga tetap utuh. Namun, kehidupan di muka bumi
Sejarah FPI
Siapa sebenarnya FPI; bagaimana lahirnya; dan apa sebenarnya tujuan mereka di balik gembar-gembor tentang syariat Islam? FPI lahir pada 17 Agustus 1998 dengan ketua umumnya Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, serta berkembang subur pada masa pemerintahan Presiden Habibie. FPI dinilai dekat dengan orang-orang di sekeliling Soeharto.
Di masa Prabowo Subianto aktif di TNI, FPI diduga sebagai salah satu binaan menantu Soeharto itu. Namun, setelah Prabowo jatuh, FPI kemudian cenderung mendekati kelompok Jendral Wiranto yang tengah bermusuhan dengan kelompok Prabowo.
Keberkaitan FPI dengan Wiranto barangkali dapat dideduksi dari aksi ratusan milisi FPI yang selalu berpakaian putih-putih, ketika menyatroni kantor Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (Komnas HAM), memprotes pemeriksaan Jendral Wiranto dan kawan-kawan oleh KPP HAM.
Milisi FPI yang datang ke kantor Komnas HAM dengan membawa pedang dan golok, bahkan menuntut lembaga hak asasi manusia itu dibubarkan karena dianggap lancang memeriksa para jendral.
Demonstrasi Tandingan
Sementara itu kedekatannya dengan ABRI terlihat dalam aksi demonstrasi tandingan yang dilakukannya melawan aksi mahasiswa yang menentang RUU Keadaan Darurat yang diajukan Mabes TNI kepada DPR pada 24 Oktober 1999. Setelah jatuhnya Wiranto, kelompok itu kehilangan induknya, dan mulai mengalihkan perhatian kepada upaya penegakan syariat Islam di Indonesia. (Syamsul Rizal Panggabean: 2007).
Penyerbuan yang dilakukan di mal, diskotek, bar, dan kafe-kafe, sebenarnya dilakukan oleh laskar FPI yang berbasis preman Betawi. Laskar FPI yang diduga adalah preman-preman itu kemudian dikomando untuk menyerbu tempat-tempat hiburan pada bulan Ramadan dengan dalih penegakan syariat. Namun yang terjadi hanya tempat-tempat hiburan tertentu yang tidak memberikan uang keamanan yang diserbu.
Dalam merespons kejadian tersebut, polisi terlihat hanya datang menyaksikan aksi-aksi perusakan. Sekalipun polisi kemudian mengkritik aksi-aksi itu, tetapi tak satu pun anggota FPI yang ditangkap. Sejumlah pengamat mengungkapkan óyang juga diyakini kebenarannya oleh sebagian masyarakató bahwa polisi telah memanfaatkan FPI dan milisinya, Laskar Pembela Syariat Islam (LPSI) untuk memaksakan protection rackets-nya. Sebagai akibatnya, polisi memaafkan aksi tersebut atau bahkan mengarahkan serangan itu ke sasarannya.
Jika fakta-fakta tersebut benar-benar terjadi, maka masyarakat dan negara harus waspada. Kalau ada konspirasi antara preman dan aparat negara, berarti negara sudah kehilangan kontrol terhadap kehidupan warganya.
Rakyat kecil yang sudah hidup miskin, terusik ketenteramannya dan selalu diributi oleh teror-teror kekerasan, harus diutamakan. Warga negara membutuhkan jaminan ekonomi, jaminan lapangan kerja, jaminan kebebasan beragama dan kebebasan berpolitik.
Jika negara telah gagal menjamin hak-hak tersebut, wajar apabila kewajiban sebagai warga negara dan sebagai manusia terabaikan. Bahkan menurut John Rawl berbalik menjadi ketidakpatuhan kepada negara (civil disobedience).
Saatnya negara bertindak tegas terhadap para perusuh, baik itu preman maupun orang-orang dalam sendiri yang tidak puas dengan pembagian ”kue kekuasaan”. Negara ini bukan milik orang dan kelompok tertentu, tetapi milik rakyat. Siapa pun yang terlibat dalam kekacauan terhadap negara, baik yang berjubah agama maupun yang berbaju apa pun, harus diadili. Siapkah pemerintah menegakkan keadilan dan membubarkan FPI?(68)
Gugun El-Guyanie, sekjen Lembaga Kajian Keagamaan dan Kebangsaan (LK3 ) PW GP Ansor DIY.
(Suara Merdeka, 4/6/2008)
Wednesday, May 21, 2008
BELAJAR KE AKAR RUMPUT
LIMA PERTANYAAN PENTING DALAM PENGORGANISASIAN MASYARAKAT
Dalam dunia gerakan sosial kita sering kali mendengar istilah pengorganisasian masyarakat atau Comunity Organising untuk lebih mengenal dan memahami konsep pengorganisasian masyarakat tersebut ada baiknya kita lihat lima (V) pertanyaan penting dibawah ini:
I. MENGAPA PENGORGANISASIAN MASYARAKAT ?
1. Adanya kondisi dan situasi ketimpangan yang sistemik:ketertindasan, ketidakadilan
ketimpangan sistemik tersebut muncul dalam wajah:
- Kehidupan perekonomian (kemiskinan)
- Pendidikan
- Gender
- Kepastian hukum
- Kesehatan
Sistemik karena situasi dan kondisi tersebut muncul tidak dengan sendirinya tetapi dari sebuah kebijakan dan praktik kebijakan yang melemahkan masyarakat
2. Lemahnya lembaga-lembaga representasi publik
3. Belum adanya perkembangan yang baik PARADIGMA negara terhadap partisipasi publik dalam pembangunan
II. KEMANAKAH MUARA PENGORGANISASIAN MASYARAKAT ?
Muara dari CO adalah agar masyarakat berdaya, posisi tawar rakyat meningkat Vis a Vis (berhadapan dgn Pemerintah) maupun fihak lain (pemilik Modal)
III. APA SAJA PRINSIP-PRINSIP PENGORGANISASIAN MASYARAKAT ?
K4P4B
1. Keberpihakan
2. Keterbukaan
3. Kemandirian
4. Kesetaraan
5. Pendekatan holistik
6. Pemberdayaan
7. Partisipatif
8. Praxis
9. Berkelanjutan
IV. APAKAH SYARAT-SYARAT PENGORGANISASIAN MASYARAKAT ?
1. Keberpihakan pada masyarakat bawah
2. Jujur
3. Terbuka
4. Mau berkorban
5. Sabar
V. BAGAIMANAKAH TAHAPAN-TAHAPAN PENGORGANISASIAN MASYARAKAT?
1. Penyatuan integrasi
2. Adaptasi
3. Membangun kontak
4. Pendidikan sosial
5. Perencanaan pengorganisasian
6. Pembentukan kelompok kecil
7. Pembentukan organisasi
8. Perencanaan Organisasi
9. Aksi – refleksi – aksi
10. Berjaringan
ASAH JIWA
Kaya Karena Sederhana
Oleh: Gede Prama
Menjadi orang kaya, itulah cita-cita banyak sekali orang. Hal yang sama juga pernah melanda saya. Dulu, ketika masih duduk di bangku SMU, kemudian menyaksikan ada rumah indah dan besar, dan di depannya duduk sepasang orang tua lagi menikmati keindahan rumahnya, sering saya bertanya ke diri sendiri : akankah saya bisa sampai di
Penyelaman saya secara lebih mendalam bahkan menghasilkan sejumlah ketakutan untuk menjadi kaya.
Dalam tataran pencaharian seperti ini, tiba-tiba saja saya membaca karya Shakti Gawain dalam jurnal Personal Excellence edisi September 2001 yang menulis : > '> If we have too many things we don> '> t truly need or want, our live become overly complicated> '> . Siapa saja yang memiliki terlalu banyak hal yang tidak betul-betul dibutuhkan, kehidupannya akan berwajah sangat rumit dan kompleks.
Rupanya saya tidak sendiri dalam hal ketakutan bertemu hidup yang amat rumit karena memiliki terlalu banyak hal yang tidak betul-betul diperlukan. Shakti Gawain juga serupa. Lebih dari sekadar takut, di tingkatan materi yang amat berlebihan, ketakutan, kecemasan, dan bahkan keterikatan berlebihan mulai muncul.
Masih segar dalam ingatan, bagaimana tidur saya amat terganggu di hari pertama ketika baru bisa membeli mobil. Sebentar-sebentar bangun sambil melihat garasi. Demikian juga ketika baru duduk di kursi orang nomer satu di perusahaan. Keterikatan agar duduk di
Disamping merampok kebebasan dan keheningan, kekayaan materi juga menghasilkan harapan-harapan baru yang bergerak maju. Lebih tinggi, lebih tinggi dan lebih tinggi lagi. Demikianlah kekayaan dengan amat rajin mendorong manusia untuk memproduksi harapan yang lebih tinggi. Tidak ada yang salah dengan memiliki harapan yang lebih tinggi, sejauh seseorang bisa menyeimbangkannya dengan rasa syukur. Apa lagi kalau harapan bisa mendorong orang bekerja amat keras, plus keikhlasan untuk bersyukur pada sang hidup. Celakanya, dalam banyak hal terjadi, harapan ini terbang dan berlari liar. Dan kemudian membuat kehidupan berlari seperti kucing yang mengejar ekornya sendiri.
Berefleksi dan bercermin dari sinilah, saya sudah teramat lama meninggalkan kehidupan yang demikian ngotot mengejar kekayaan materi. Demikian tidak ngototnya, sampai-sampai ada rekan yang menyebut saya bodoh, tidak mengerti bisnis, malah ada yang menyebut teramat lugu. Untungnya, badan kehidupan saya sud> ah demikian licin oleh sebutan-sebutan. Sehingga setiap sebutan, lewat saja tanpa memberikan bekas yang berarti.
Karena keyakinan seperti inilah, maka dalam setiap doa saya senantiasa memohon agar seluruh permohonan saya dalam doa diganti dengan keikhlasan, keikhlasan dan hanya keikhlasan. Tidak hanya dalam doa, dalam keseharian hidup juga demikian.
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