Suaedy
By Ahmad Suaedy
It is almost as if democracy and decentralization in Indonesia is irreversible. These processes have thus far continued through the establishment of democratic pillar institutions along side supporting institutions, such as the general elections which have been independently managed by the General Election Commission (KPU), both national elections for parliament and the presidency and also elections for regional heads; the removal of military institutions from national political and economic domination; as well as freedom of the press. All this was impossible to even dream about during the New Order ten years ago.
More important than this is the reassertion of the existence of the Indonesian nation through amendments to the 1945 constitution, which is principally a secular state in that it is based on equality of all citizens in the face of the law without discrimination against religion, skin colour, race, gender or class, and in that it is also based on human rights principles. Thus, constitutionally, Pancasila principles form the philosophical basis of the Indonesian nation, that is, Belief in One Almighty God; Just and Civilized Humanity; the Unity of Indonesia; Democracy Guided by the Wisdom of Representative Deliberation; and Social Justice for all Indonesians. These principles were strengthened, once again, as the democratic foundation of Indonesia at precisely the same time that post-New Order changes began to occur.
However, new challenges have emerged and have the potential to threaten the process of democratization and decentralization. Namely, the strengthening of political identity which has threatened to undermine the foundations of the constitution itself. Since this, various models of violence have emerged, particularly collective violence between groups, based on religion or ethnicity or any other categorization. At the same time, state and government guarantees of religious freedom have been waived due to demands of specific groups, which have involved force and even violence, against other sects. Such groups have thus forced the government to take actions which have restricted religious freedoms. The Joint Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and the Attorney General in June 2008 limited the movements of Ahmadiyah, a Muslim sect, and was indicative of the government’s lack of power in facing demands from groups opposing religious freedom.
Instead of protecting attacked groups from their attackers, the state apparatus has often worsened the victims’ financial situations by physically evacuating them while allowing their attackers to destroy their property. The state apparatus then brings the victims to court on the count of blasphemy. If this tendency is allowed to continue, it is feared that it will plant seeds of discrimination to the point that the government can no longer make any guarantees, and will culminate in demands to alter the constitution. Thus the opposing demands of collective violence and religious freedom can hinder or become a point of reversal to the achievement of democracy in the form of justice and equality of all citizens in the face of the law.
The Basis of Indonesian Democracy: Theory and Practice
The strengthening of the democratic base is reflected in the reassertion of guarantees of equality of all citizens of all groups, as well as the guarantee of human rights through various sections in the constitution. In the 1945 constitution on the topic of human rights section 28 emphasises the guarantee of equality of all citizens and the obligation of the state to protect them, as well as the right of citizens to hold a religion or belief. “Everyone has the right to secure equal opportunity in the government. Everyone has the right to citizenship status.” (verse 28D). In the same section, point E mentions the right to adhere to, carry out, and even propagate a religion. It does not mention specific religions:
Everyone is entitled to the right to profess and practice the religion of his choice, to choose an appropriate education and teaching method, to choose proper employment, to choose nationality, to choose a place of residence within the territory of a State and the right to leave it as well as to return.
Everyone has the right to the freedom of embracing a religion or belief, the right to hold opinions and to act and behave according to one’s conscience.
Everyone has the right to the freedom of association, assembly and expression.
Also, in the same section, point I items 2 and 3 guarantee the absence of discrimination in any form, as well as respect for identity and community traditions:
2. Everyone has the right to be free from all forms of discriminatory treatment and is entitled to protection against such prejudices.
3. Cultural identity and traditional community rights deserve respect in line with changes in time and developments in civilization.
All of these sections are products of the amendment which placed more emphasis on the sections on human rights present in the original constitution. The foundations of this constitution were further strengthened with the ratification of the ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) through Law No. 12, 2005; as well as Law No. 39, 1999 on Human Rights and Law No. 26, 2000 on Human Rights Court. These all guaranteed the equal rights of citizens to freedom of religion and belief, as well as expression. What is more important, is that the implementation of all these laws was delegated to the state, particularly the government.
However, this very solid constitution is not automatically reflected in practice. In the legal context, there are at the least two fundamental problems, and this is before thorough research into legal practice has been undertaken. Firstly, is that the laws and regulations dating from before the constitutional that challenge or even contradict constitutional guarantees have not been automatically annulled and have not yet been changed in accordance with the constitution’s directives. Thus what results is discrepancy and even contradiction between the constitution and the laws under it. One law concerned with religious life is article 156a of the Criminal Code (KUHP) which is from Law PNPS No. 1/1966. It forbids a person or group of people from practicing and interpreting a belief which deviates from the main religion, of which there are six: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. The article stating this is popularly known as the “blasphemy” article. It reads:
Liable to a sentence of five years imprisonment for whosoever in public intentionally express their views or engage in actions:
1. that in principle incite hostilities and considered as abuse or defamation of a religion embraced in Indonesia;
2. for the purpose of discouraging others to embrace any religion that is based on the belief in the one and only God." (Article 156a of the Criminal Code)
This article has recently been used frequently by specific groups to demand that other groups, which they consider to have deviated from the mainstream understandings of the primary religions, be jailed on the count of blasphemy.
The second problem is that new drafts of laws and regulations since the amendment are, intentionally or not, often out of synchrony, or even in blatant contradiction, with the demands of the amendment. A clear example of this is found in the articles of the draft of the Criminal Code on religion. The article on “blasphemy” which, in the old KUHP was only one article, 156a, was, during the reformation era, the cause of many jailings, and in the new RKUHP has been broken down much further to now span 8 articles which, if seen from the perspective of religious freedom, highly contradicts the constitution’s principles (Rumadi et.al., 2007). Likewise the Law on Demographic Administration just legalized in 2006, which mentions the two categories of government “recognised religions” and “unrecognized religions” which automatically ignore belief in non-formal religions, such as in traditional religion (in the Indonesian context) or indigenous beliefs which, notabene, are original Indonesian faiths.
Article 8 of this law says:
(4) Obligation as it is intended in verse (1) refers to requirement procedures for the record of important events reported by citizens whose religion is not formally recognised in legal regulations, or by adherents of Indonesian traditional religions, as defined in legal regulations.
Article 61
(2) The explanation as intended in verse (1) refers to the religious labelling of citizens whose religion is not formally recognised in formal regulations or to the adherents of Indonesian traditional religions. In the civil registry, the category for religion will be left blank, though these citizens will still be served and registered.
Article 64
(2) The explanation on religion as intended in verse (1) refers to the religious labelling of citizens whose religion is not formally recognised in formal regulations or to the adherents of Indonesian traditional religions. In the civil registry, the category for religion will be left blank, though these citizens will still be served and registered. (Law No. 23 / 2006 on Demographic Administration)
These articles, besides contradicting the amendments, also have the potential to discriminate. For instance, it has implications for the public services concerning Identity Cards (KTP), and the Birth, Marriage and Inheritance registry.
Sadly, the use of article 156a KUHP has increased since the reformation. Based on records, this article was used only once prior to 1990, for the case against HB, who wrote the short story The Increasingly Cloudy Sky under the pseudonym Ki Panji Kusmin. He was accused of defaming Islam. As the chief editor of the magazine SASTRA in which the story was published, he was unwilling to reveal the real identity of the author (who was, unbeknown to the public, himself), and was thus sentenced to one year in jail in 1968. After this, in 1990 the article was used in a case against the chief editor of Tabloid Monitor, Arswendo Atmowiloto, also because of mass demands in relation to the tabloid’s survey which placed the Prophet Muhammad as the eleventh most admired figure. After 2000, reference to the article increased sharply, and in the period 2004-2008 there were at least ten cases (Rumadi, 2007). Public demands based on this article increased, not only in the courts, but also in direct political policies of the government, as shown in the case where about 7000 Muslims in robes surrounded the Presidential Palace to demand the release of a ban against the Ahmadiyah sect. In response, the government immediately released their policy, which limited Ahmadiyah’s expression, through the Joint Decree signed by the three ministers, the Minister for Religious Affairs, the Minister for Internal Affairs, and the Attorney General, on June 9, 2008. This joint decree has been followed by provincial regulations, for example, like that which has been recently issued by the South Sumatran governor, banning Ahmadiyah from his province.
Syariah-nuanced Local Regulations
In line with development of laws, the appearance of several religiously nuanced local regulations (‘Kanun’ in Aceh) needs to be examined separately. Robin Bush (2007) has already looked quantitatively at the recent spread of these religiously (particularly Islamically) nuanced regulations, finding that there are about 78 local regulations in 52 regencies and cities. This is not including decrees from regents, mayors and governors, or drafts that regional parliaments have not yet decided upon. If this growth continues, like it or not, it may influence the direction of the development of national law or even the constitution. The Supreme Court’s decision to reject the judicial review of the Tangerang Local Regulation (Nurun Nisa et.al., 2007) against prostitution which discriminates against women. The Court made the decision saying that it was not within the scope of the Supreme Court. It has evoked greater worry about such developments.
Suaedy
The appearance of these local regulations is not always religiously motivated. In fact they are sometimes products of political pragmatism and are outlets for those facing corruption charges, or even direct photocopies of regulations from other regions. However, their geometric progression and tendency to spread deserves out attention. Nevertheless, these phenomena need not be generalised. These regulations can be split into three categories. First, are the local regulations on issues of public order or civil morality such as regulations against gambling, prostitution and drinking. These issues have not only drawn the attention and commitment of people from specific religions, but of almost all people, each with their own motivations.
Second, are the regulations on religious ability and religious ritual obligations. This includes regulations on the obligation to read the Qur’an, pay zakat (alms), and so on. Such regulations are aimed specifically at Muslims, yet have the potential to discriminate against both Muslims themselves as well as other people. While the third category includes the regulations concerning religious symbols, such as the obligation for women to wear a jilbab, and for men to wear Muslim dress on Fridays. This third category of regulations, when put into practice, often causes discrimination, both in terms of public service by the government, as well as in the community itself. It discriminates not only against non-Muslims, but also against Muslims themselves (Suaedy et.al., 2007).
Indeed, with such categories, not all local regulations are fit to be dealt with on the constitutional level, but must rather be dealt with on several different levels to obtain proportional responses (Wahid Institute Report, 2008). First of all, paradigmatic and substantive parameters of these regulations need to be defined, and strong arguments provided for such definitions. For example, the state’s basis of the Pancasila and 1945 Constitution with all its amendments is the primary measure, while human rights principles must also be supportive. It is difficult to respond to regulations concerning aspects of public order, such as gambling, prostitution and drinking, on such a paradigmatic and substantive level because it is the joint concern and commitment of society.
For regulations of this kind, monitoring of their aims and the steps in their application is necessary. It is necessary because, for example, regulations of disbandment without solution cause mass unemployment and suffering. Monitoring is also needed of its methods of enforcement, for example such methods might include using violent means and redundant and discriminative criminalization. This being the case, advocacy would better fulfill the objective. Without real and evident standards or norms and a measured response such as this, it is feared that we will have a debate without basis.
The following parameter concerns the procedure for formation of regulations and the basis or preamble for these regulations. One important measure in this matter is Law No. 10, 2004 on procedures for forming laws. Included within it are procedures for forming local regulations and other rulings. It is important to test the consistency of the preamble, which serves as a base for regulations, against preexisting Indonesian laws. One must remember that some local regulations presumed valid in a specific region are only photocopies from other regions. This effectively minimizes full social participation, something regulated by the above mentioned Law as well as by the well intended efforts to resolve the social problems within the specific region. In addition, there are also various regulations such as decrees/official letters by Regents and Mayors which are based, for example, on MUI fatwas (religious rulings) or group opinion, and which ignore preexisting laws.
With these standards, efforts of advocacy will focus on the faults and deviations of the regulations without having to take it too high, for example to the constitutional level. The most dangerous aspect of all this is when the government interferes and judges non main stream beliefs. This judgment ends in the banning of the belief/religion/sect as evidenced by the decision made by The Coordinating Agency for Monitoring Religious Sects and Mystical Beliefs, under the coordination of The State Court (MRoRI- WI, No. 6). It violates the rights to expression and freedom of religion and belief.
The following standard concerns local political contexts. If it is indeed proven that local regulations or similar rulings are really only the political commodities of politicians used to attain a specific position, advocacy can be focused on this political commoditization. In South Sulawesi and Cianjur, for example, it has been proven that the “produce” of Syariah Islam (Islamic law) does not significantly impact the chances of a pair being elected as Governor or Regent. These areas known as “maniacs” in relation to Islamic law elected a Governor and vice Governor who hold visions of pluralism and tolerance, but a Regent who does not value such issues.
Occasionally, political issues do become major problems and this demands the courage and vision from those in the central government. But this remains unrealized. Theoretically, decrees/official letters of Regents, Mayors, and Governors which legally speaking are not procedural, for example regulations based on MUI fatwas, and also deviational local regulations, should be revoked by the Minister for Internal Affairs. But because the politics are complex, the government prefers to keep silent, worried about the political reaction which will diminish society’s trust in them. Thus the government needs the courage to take political risks in correcting constitutional deviations (Suaedy, 2006). The Minister for Internal Affairs could have cancelled the implementation of the provincial regulation in Lombok on zakat to allow the salary deductions from civil servants in the name of zakat collection. Unfortunately, the regulation was cancelled only after a huge demonstration and labor strike.
The Strengthening of Political Identity
Once again, the emphasis of the constitution on guaranteeing freedom of religion and belief has been seriously disrupted by the strengthening of religious groups in responding to the development of society and government policies. But in fact, these groups do not do anything to strengthen democracy by eradicating corruption and pushing for transparency. Instead, they strengthen primordialism based on religious grouping and similarity of beliefs. In the era where people can speak freely and the government has no choice but to listen to religious demands, deviation from constitutional and democratic principles is highly possible.
This situation is worsen by the fact that local leaders are inexperienced in managing society’s aspiration in democratic manner. It is not surprising if the government, both regional and central, executive, legislative and judicative, tends to listen to and prioritize the demands of the small number of people who speak loudest and who sometimes resort to intimidation or violence, over giving justice to the large but silent majority. Thus, the increasing influence of these religious groups has provided further obstacles to the implementation of democracy, and the enforcement of the constitution and law.
The strengthening of MUI’s (Indonesian Council of Ulama) role must be given special attention. It is visible in MUI’s ability to loudly voice their views and demands. What makes them stronger than most social organisations is their relationship with the state. MUI was established by Soeharto’s New Order regime. It has, from its establishment, been used as an instrument of the authoritarian government to support its power and handle religious movements against the government. Thus MUI has extensive infrastructure and networking. For instance, it has formal branches throughout Indonesia, in regencies and provinces. It also has informal branches at district level. All branches receive government funding. In addition, MUI also obtains extra funding from its own religious projects outside of government or public control. Examples include the halal labeling of foods and beverages, consultation positions in all the branches of Bank Syari’ah that have syariah (Islamic law) outlets, and specific political projects from the government, such as public education on specific drafts of law regarding religious issues (Suaedy et.al., 2006).
MUI’s membership system is not individual based as with other Islamic social organisations. Thus, any Islamic social organisation which shares the same doctrines and theology as MUI are free to join. As a result, it is almost as if MUI has the prerogative to determine whether an Islamic sect is legal or illegal, whether it is deviant or not, and also the beliefs its members must hold. Ahmadiyah, for example, can not become a member because MUI considers it deviant. Moreover, MUI has urged the government to ban it (MRoRI-WI No. 4). On the other hand, no matter how politically subversive it may be, if MUI deems a group as not deviant, they will be accommodated. The most visible example is Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). HTI’s doctrine states that they are an anti-democratic political organisation, or in religious terminology they ‘meng-haram-kan’ (forbid) democracy. Thus HTI is, from all perspectives, is against the Pancasila and 1945 constitution, and thus against the philosophic and constitutional basis of Indonesia, yet MUI welcomes them. HTI presence even extends throughout MUI, from the very center to the regions (Suaedy et.al., 2006).
This kind of membership system also means that MUI’s products and fatwa (religious decrees) tend to be conservative and in line with radical Islam. This is because there are not so many moderate Islamic organisations, even though those that do exist have enormous membership. In hearings or decision making, each MUI member organisation is given equal representation. So, despite the fact that Muhammadiyah and NU have between 25 to 40 or so million members, each of these organisations are given equal representation to FPI (Islamic Defenders Front), HTI and MMI (Indonesian Mujahadeen Council), all of which are radical and only have hundreds of thousands of members. There are thus very few moderate Islamic organisations in comparison to radical, conservative organisations, which grow like mushrooms during the wet season.
The subsequent result is that any Islamic organisations, including fundamentalist organisations and movements which are against democracy and the Pancasila, can become members of and can be dominant within MUI. The only exception is those groups declared terrorist, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). MUI is thus really a bunker for subversive and fundamentalist organisations and movements in Indonesia. Further, because MUI is funded by the government, these fundamentalist organisations and movements also receive indirect subsidies from the government through MUI. The government is thus helping radical and fundamentalist movements, which are even anti-Pancasila and anti-the 1945 constitution, with capacity building (Suaedy et.al., 2006). In 2005, for example, MUI released a fatwa against pluralism, liberalism and secularism. It was a fatwa that contradicted the existence of the Republic of Indonesia itself and has prompted specific groups to take the law into their own hands through force and violence against those they deem to have deviated from this very MUI fatwa. The fatwa 7/MUNAS VII/MUI/II/2005 states that:
1. Religious Pluralism, Secularism and Liberalism, as referred to in the first section, are ideologies that conflict with Islamic teachings.
2. Muslims are forbidden to embrace Religious Pluralism, Secularism and Liberalism.
The phenomena of the strengthening of MUI’s position and its radical and fundamentalist elements, have drastically increased since Susilo Bambang Yudoyono’s (SBY) presidency. This is because SBY is closer to Islamic political parties which are loyal in their support for him, including the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the Star and Crescent Party (PBB), and the United Development Party (PPP). The secular Democratic Party is the only exception to this, as it is the party SBY established himself; yet it lacks a sufficiently strong intellectual basis. Thus SBY’s presidency is, in practice, largely supported by the above Islamic parties.
SBY’s hidden and open connections to these Islamist parties reveals desires to establish an Islamic state. It can be seen in SBY’s appointment of K.H. Ma’ruf Amin, the head and the most radical and vocal MUI spokesperson on anti-pluralism and anti-freedom of religion and belief, as member of the presidential advisory council in the field of religion. The direction of SBY’s religious policy and perspective, and of religious freedom, is thus quite clear (See Van Zorge, January 29, 2008). There is so much inter-religious prostration and violence, and attacks and violence against groups deemed deviant, that the president can almost never be heard urging the state apparatus to be firmer and more just in dealing with the perpetrators of religious violence, as well as in protecting the victims of prostration and violence. He also cannot be heard expressing his desires for human rights and the constitution and its guarantee of religious freedom to be enforced. On the contrary, the president even opened MUI national work meeting in November 2007 by indicating his explicit support for and agreement with all MUI decisions. In this national work meeting MUI released the fatwa listing the ten criteria for deviant sects to be used as a guide for the Muslim community to independently monitor deviant sects. The consequences have been clear: increasingly uncontrollable inter-religious violence which tends to be destructive and pushes society to take justice into their own hands when it comes to so-considered deviant groups (MRoRI-WI No. 4). This fatwa on the ten criteria for deviance is as follows:
The Ten Guidelines for Monitoring Deviant Religious Sects
1. Disagree with the six Islamic principles of faith;
2. Believe and act differently to what the Qur'an and hadith teach.
3. Believe in decrees that come after the Qur'an.
4. Refuse the authenticity of the Qur'an.
5. Interprete the Qur’an differently from traditional interpretations.
6. Disagree that the hadith is another source of Islamic teaching.
7. Humiliate, despise or look down on prophets and messengers.
8. Do not recognise prophet Muhammad as the last prophet and messenger.
9. Change, add, or remove religious ritual priciples that are determined in syariah, such as "A person can go on the hajj without going to Mecca", and "a person does not have to pray five times a day”.
10. Label other Muslim’s infidel without a syariah-based explanation. For instance, they are infidel just because they do not come from the same Islamic group.
The constitution strongly guarantees citizens, as both individuals and in groups, the right to adhere to a religion and belief, as well as the right to equal and fair protection. But it is clear that in practice quite the contrary occurs. Under SBY’s governance, the state and all its apparatus has been widely involved and discrimatory in issues of the religion and belief of citizens (Van Zorge Report, January 29, 2008).
Collective Violence
Political changes in Indonesia, both the drastic ones of 1965 and 1998 and more gradual ones like the general elections, always have violent elements, to the extent that one researcher labeled Indonesia as a “state of violence” (Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad, 2002). The general elections of the New Order, particularly the 1971 election which was a continuation of the 1965 political configuration, remain undefeated in enormity of their violence. As a result, we need to give attention to times of political formation, such as the current era which is a continuation from the drastic change of 1998.
If we look at the trend so far, inter-communal violence - religious, ethnic and so on – has a increased and government apparatus has been unable to control it. Moreover, religious institutions, especially government affiliated ones, intentionally or not, contribute to the tension and encourage the masses to commit violence. This was the case with the MUI fatwa on deviant sects, and also on Ahmadiyah, and also the case with the Department of Religious Affairs’ insinuations.
UNSFIR’s 2004 report, for example, on “Patterns of Collective Violence in Indonesia 1990-2003” contained shocking data on the amount of collective violence in Indonesia. Collective here refers to violence which occurs between ethnic groups, between adherents of different religions, of between adherents of the same religion but different sects or groups.
These data showed that 89.3% of communal violence resulted in victims, and communal violence accounted for 16.6% of incidents that did not produce victims from all the violence that occurred in Indonesia from 1990-2003. Violence, according to this research, occurred in almost all Indonesian provinces, yet its increase was not uniform over all provinces. Yet it has been collective violence which has always caused the worst destruction and loss to human life and property in comparison to other forms of violence (Ashutosh et.al., pp. 25-27). This does not even include the violence in the Ambon or Moluccas case of Muslims verses Christians, or West Kalimantan case of ethnic Dayaks verses the Madurese.
Over the years from 2004-2006 the Wahid Institute has recorded, as far as can be obtained from the quite restricted mass media, at least 28 cases of violence in several complex forms of collective violence, not only inter-religious but also intra-religious (Suaedy, 2007).
Meanwhile, from 2007 to mid-2008, there have been 58 cases: 18 cases of accusations of deviance; 28 cases of inter- and intra- religious violence; 2 cases of religiously based regulations; and 6 freedom of expression cases protesting against speaking freely to people of specific religions due to religious reasons (Wahid Institute Report, 2008a);
Unavoidable Transformation
The above discussion shows that political change should not stop after the establishment of democratic political institutions, but needs to be accompanied by transformation of thinking. This transformation should also be accompanied by more just social formations and legal reformation that enables the development of a democratic culture. Democratic development now faces horizontal challenges, in comparison to during the New Order era in which it faced vertical challenges from the government and particularly the military.
Various analyses of the obstacles in the way of democracy indicate that the weakness of civil society is the major obstacle. It is weak both in offering more fair social and political formulations as well as in speaking out against deviation from democratic procedures. Such weakness has widespread consequences. For example, the recruitment of politicians who prioritize money politics and accept any means of doing things has resulted in deviation from democratic order and deviation from the ideal objectives of democracy itself (Wahid Institute Report 2008).
Using democracy as justification, those with money and certain primordial group leaders can use what they have to force their desires (often violently) to achieve what they want. They do so not only in cases of religious freedom, but also in almost all important decision making processes. SBY’s indecisiveness has allowed the democratic process to be dominated by destructive elements.
In this perspective, SBY’s presidency has been highly tolerant to what Appleby describes as religious illiteracy—a shallow and ignorant religious understanding which easily resorts to violence at times of sudden change or crisis (Appleby, 2000:69). Continued provocation by the leaders of this religious illiteracy, which SBY’s government has allowed, even met the demands of at times, has been sufficient to spread hatred and violence. As a result, the establishment of religious literacy has been threatened when the leaders of illiterate religions or religious doctrines are questioned critically over their legality in the process of change, while those who want to discuss religious issues and place them in social reality with the aim to find rational solutions are isolated, even threatened.
There is high potential for the growth of social groups, particularly those with links to religious communities, who want to push for more substantial, just and critical social political participation, to be ignored. In fact, lately there have been arrests of civil society groups speaking out against the government. The leader of the Indonesian Awakening Movement (GIB) is a case in point.
The indications and tendencies of the democratic process in Indonesia as seen in the cases of freedom of religion and belief, and the spread of communal violence, would suggest there is still a way to go before democracy is stable. It requires hard work and determination to initiate the process and to smoothly and safely achieve the desired aims.***
Depok, Indonesia, September 12, 2008
*This paper presented at INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM Islam for Social Justice and sustainability:New Perspective on Islams and Pluralism in Indonesia Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), Kyoto University, Kyoto, JAPAN September, 16-17th, 2008.
**The writer is Executive Director the Wahid Institute, Jakarta
References:
Appleby, R. S. 2000, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion and Violence, and Reconciliation, New York: Rowman & Littlefied Publishers, Inc.
Colombijn, Freek and Lindblad, J. Thomas (ed.), 2002, “Introduction,” dalam Roots of Violence in Indonesia, KITLV Press, The Netherlands.
Gamal Ferdhi et.al., 2006, “Depancasialisasi Lewat Perda SI,” Supplement of the Wahid Institute in GATRA magazine, 29 April 2006.
Laclau, E. (ed.), 1990, “Introduction”, in The Making of Political Identity New York: Verso, pp. 1-8.
Nurun Nisa et.al., 2007, “Bersama Menolak Perda Diskriminatif, “ in NAWALA the Wahid Institute, available at: http://www.wahidinstitute.org/indonesia/images/stories/Nawala/nawala-v.pdf.
Robin L. Bush, 2007, “Regional ‘Shari’ah’ Regulation in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?” Working paper presented at the Indonesia Update forum, September 2007 at ANU, Canberra (unpublished).
Rumadi et.al., March 2006, “Menanti Negara Bernyali” Supplement of the Wahid Institute in GATRA magazine.
Rumadi, 2007, Delik Penodaan Agama Dan Kehidupan Beragama dalam R-KUHP, The Wahid Institute-TIFA, Jakarta.
Saidi, A. (ed.), 2004, Menekuk Agama, Membangun Tahta, Kebijakan Agama Orde Baru Jakarta: Desantara.
Suaedy et.al., 2006, Kala Fatwa Jadi Penjara, The Wahid Institute, Jakarta 2006.
Suaedy et.al., 2007, Politisasi Agama Dan Konflik Komunal, The Wahid Institute,
Suaedy, 2007, "Gerakan Muslim Progresif Paska Rejim Suharto di Indonesia,” (research report, unpublished).
Van Zorge Report, January 29, 2008.
Varshney, A. et.al., “Patterns of Collective Violence in Indonesia (1990-2003),” UNSFIR (United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery) Jakarta, July 2004.
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READ MORE - Working Paper Collective Violence, Religious Freedom and Democratization in Indonesia
By Ahmad Suaedy
It is almost as if democracy and decentralization in Indonesia is irreversible. These processes have thus far continued through the establishment of democratic pillar institutions along side supporting institutions, such as the general elections which have been independently managed by the General Election Commission (KPU), both national elections for parliament and the presidency and also elections for regional heads; the removal of military institutions from national political and economic domination; as well as freedom of the press. All this was impossible to even dream about during the New Order ten years ago.
More important than this is the reassertion of the existence of the Indonesian nation through amendments to the 1945 constitution, which is principally a secular state in that it is based on equality of all citizens in the face of the law without discrimination against religion, skin colour, race, gender or class, and in that it is also based on human rights principles. Thus, constitutionally, Pancasila principles form the philosophical basis of the Indonesian nation, that is, Belief in One Almighty God; Just and Civilized Humanity; the Unity of Indonesia; Democracy Guided by the Wisdom of Representative Deliberation; and Social Justice for all Indonesians. These principles were strengthened, once again, as the democratic foundation of Indonesia at precisely the same time that post-New Order changes began to occur.
However, new challenges have emerged and have the potential to threaten the process of democratization and decentralization. Namely, the strengthening of political identity which has threatened to undermine the foundations of the constitution itself. Since this, various models of violence have emerged, particularly collective violence between groups, based on religion or ethnicity or any other categorization. At the same time, state and government guarantees of religious freedom have been waived due to demands of specific groups, which have involved force and even violence, against other sects. Such groups have thus forced the government to take actions which have restricted religious freedoms. The Joint Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and the Attorney General in June 2008 limited the movements of Ahmadiyah, a Muslim sect, and was indicative of the government’s lack of power in facing demands from groups opposing religious freedom.
Instead of protecting attacked groups from their attackers, the state apparatus has often worsened the victims’ financial situations by physically evacuating them while allowing their attackers to destroy their property. The state apparatus then brings the victims to court on the count of blasphemy. If this tendency is allowed to continue, it is feared that it will plant seeds of discrimination to the point that the government can no longer make any guarantees, and will culminate in demands to alter the constitution. Thus the opposing demands of collective violence and religious freedom can hinder or become a point of reversal to the achievement of democracy in the form of justice and equality of all citizens in the face of the law.
The Basis of Indonesian Democracy: Theory and Practice
The strengthening of the democratic base is reflected in the reassertion of guarantees of equality of all citizens of all groups, as well as the guarantee of human rights through various sections in the constitution. In the 1945 constitution on the topic of human rights section 28 emphasises the guarantee of equality of all citizens and the obligation of the state to protect them, as well as the right of citizens to hold a religion or belief. “Everyone has the right to secure equal opportunity in the government. Everyone has the right to citizenship status.” (verse 28D). In the same section, point E mentions the right to adhere to, carry out, and even propagate a religion. It does not mention specific religions:
Everyone is entitled to the right to profess and practice the religion of his choice, to choose an appropriate education and teaching method, to choose proper employment, to choose nationality, to choose a place of residence within the territory of a State and the right to leave it as well as to return.
Everyone has the right to the freedom of embracing a religion or belief, the right to hold opinions and to act and behave according to one’s conscience.
Everyone has the right to the freedom of association, assembly and expression.
Also, in the same section, point I items 2 and 3 guarantee the absence of discrimination in any form, as well as respect for identity and community traditions:
2. Everyone has the right to be free from all forms of discriminatory treatment and is entitled to protection against such prejudices.
3. Cultural identity and traditional community rights deserve respect in line with changes in time and developments in civilization.
All of these sections are products of the amendment which placed more emphasis on the sections on human rights present in the original constitution. The foundations of this constitution were further strengthened with the ratification of the ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) through Law No. 12, 2005; as well as Law No. 39, 1999 on Human Rights and Law No. 26, 2000 on Human Rights Court. These all guaranteed the equal rights of citizens to freedom of religion and belief, as well as expression. What is more important, is that the implementation of all these laws was delegated to the state, particularly the government.
However, this very solid constitution is not automatically reflected in practice. In the legal context, there are at the least two fundamental problems, and this is before thorough research into legal practice has been undertaken. Firstly, is that the laws and regulations dating from before the constitutional that challenge or even contradict constitutional guarantees have not been automatically annulled and have not yet been changed in accordance with the constitution’s directives. Thus what results is discrepancy and even contradiction between the constitution and the laws under it. One law concerned with religious life is article 156a of the Criminal Code (KUHP) which is from Law PNPS No. 1/1966. It forbids a person or group of people from practicing and interpreting a belief which deviates from the main religion, of which there are six: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. The article stating this is popularly known as the “blasphemy” article. It reads:
Liable to a sentence of five years imprisonment for whosoever in public intentionally express their views or engage in actions:
1. that in principle incite hostilities and considered as abuse or defamation of a religion embraced in Indonesia;
2. for the purpose of discouraging others to embrace any religion that is based on the belief in the one and only God." (Article 156a of the Criminal Code)
This article has recently been used frequently by specific groups to demand that other groups, which they consider to have deviated from the mainstream understandings of the primary religions, be jailed on the count of blasphemy.
The second problem is that new drafts of laws and regulations since the amendment are, intentionally or not, often out of synchrony, or even in blatant contradiction, with the demands of the amendment. A clear example of this is found in the articles of the draft of the Criminal Code on religion. The article on “blasphemy” which, in the old KUHP was only one article, 156a, was, during the reformation era, the cause of many jailings, and in the new RKUHP has been broken down much further to now span 8 articles which, if seen from the perspective of religious freedom, highly contradicts the constitution’s principles (Rumadi et.al., 2007). Likewise the Law on Demographic Administration just legalized in 2006, which mentions the two categories of government “recognised religions” and “unrecognized religions” which automatically ignore belief in non-formal religions, such as in traditional religion (in the Indonesian context) or indigenous beliefs which, notabene, are original Indonesian faiths.
Article 8 of this law says:
(4) Obligation as it is intended in verse (1) refers to requirement procedures for the record of important events reported by citizens whose religion is not formally recognised in legal regulations, or by adherents of Indonesian traditional religions, as defined in legal regulations.
Article 61
(2) The explanation as intended in verse (1) refers to the religious labelling of citizens whose religion is not formally recognised in formal regulations or to the adherents of Indonesian traditional religions. In the civil registry, the category for religion will be left blank, though these citizens will still be served and registered.
Article 64
(2) The explanation on religion as intended in verse (1) refers to the religious labelling of citizens whose religion is not formally recognised in formal regulations or to the adherents of Indonesian traditional religions. In the civil registry, the category for religion will be left blank, though these citizens will still be served and registered. (Law No. 23 / 2006 on Demographic Administration)
These articles, besides contradicting the amendments, also have the potential to discriminate. For instance, it has implications for the public services concerning Identity Cards (KTP), and the Birth, Marriage and Inheritance registry.
Sadly, the use of article 156a KUHP has increased since the reformation. Based on records, this article was used only once prior to 1990, for the case against HB, who wrote the short story The Increasingly Cloudy Sky under the pseudonym Ki Panji Kusmin. He was accused of defaming Islam. As the chief editor of the magazine SASTRA in which the story was published, he was unwilling to reveal the real identity of the author (who was, unbeknown to the public, himself), and was thus sentenced to one year in jail in 1968. After this, in 1990 the article was used in a case against the chief editor of Tabloid Monitor, Arswendo Atmowiloto, also because of mass demands in relation to the tabloid’s survey which placed the Prophet Muhammad as the eleventh most admired figure. After 2000, reference to the article increased sharply, and in the period 2004-2008 there were at least ten cases (Rumadi, 2007). Public demands based on this article increased, not only in the courts, but also in direct political policies of the government, as shown in the case where about 7000 Muslims in robes surrounded the Presidential Palace to demand the release of a ban against the Ahmadiyah sect. In response, the government immediately released their policy, which limited Ahmadiyah’s expression, through the Joint Decree signed by the three ministers, the Minister for Religious Affairs, the Minister for Internal Affairs, and the Attorney General, on June 9, 2008. This joint decree has been followed by provincial regulations, for example, like that which has been recently issued by the South Sumatran governor, banning Ahmadiyah from his province.
Syariah-nuanced Local Regulations
In line with development of laws, the appearance of several religiously nuanced local regulations (‘Kanun’ in Aceh) needs to be examined separately. Robin Bush (2007) has already looked quantitatively at the recent spread of these religiously (particularly Islamically) nuanced regulations, finding that there are about 78 local regulations in 52 regencies and cities. This is not including decrees from regents, mayors and governors, or drafts that regional parliaments have not yet decided upon. If this growth continues, like it or not, it may influence the direction of the development of national law or even the constitution. The Supreme Court’s decision to reject the judicial review of the Tangerang Local Regulation (Nurun Nisa et.al., 2007) against prostitution which discriminates against women. The Court made the decision saying that it was not within the scope of the Supreme Court. It has evoked greater worry about such developments.
Suaedy
The appearance of these local regulations is not always religiously motivated. In fact they are sometimes products of political pragmatism and are outlets for those facing corruption charges, or even direct photocopies of regulations from other regions. However, their geometric progression and tendency to spread deserves out attention. Nevertheless, these phenomena need not be generalised. These regulations can be split into three categories. First, are the local regulations on issues of public order or civil morality such as regulations against gambling, prostitution and drinking. These issues have not only drawn the attention and commitment of people from specific religions, but of almost all people, each with their own motivations.
Second, are the regulations on religious ability and religious ritual obligations. This includes regulations on the obligation to read the Qur’an, pay zakat (alms), and so on. Such regulations are aimed specifically at Muslims, yet have the potential to discriminate against both Muslims themselves as well as other people. While the third category includes the regulations concerning religious symbols, such as the obligation for women to wear a jilbab, and for men to wear Muslim dress on Fridays. This third category of regulations, when put into practice, often causes discrimination, both in terms of public service by the government, as well as in the community itself. It discriminates not only against non-Muslims, but also against Muslims themselves (Suaedy et.al., 2007).
Indeed, with such categories, not all local regulations are fit to be dealt with on the constitutional level, but must rather be dealt with on several different levels to obtain proportional responses (Wahid Institute Report, 2008). First of all, paradigmatic and substantive parameters of these regulations need to be defined, and strong arguments provided for such definitions. For example, the state’s basis of the Pancasila and 1945 Constitution with all its amendments is the primary measure, while human rights principles must also be supportive. It is difficult to respond to regulations concerning aspects of public order, such as gambling, prostitution and drinking, on such a paradigmatic and substantive level because it is the joint concern and commitment of society.
For regulations of this kind, monitoring of their aims and the steps in their application is necessary. It is necessary because, for example, regulations of disbandment without solution cause mass unemployment and suffering. Monitoring is also needed of its methods of enforcement, for example such methods might include using violent means and redundant and discriminative criminalization. This being the case, advocacy would better fulfill the objective. Without real and evident standards or norms and a measured response such as this, it is feared that we will have a debate without basis.
The following parameter concerns the procedure for formation of regulations and the basis or preamble for these regulations. One important measure in this matter is Law No. 10, 2004 on procedures for forming laws. Included within it are procedures for forming local regulations and other rulings. It is important to test the consistency of the preamble, which serves as a base for regulations, against preexisting Indonesian laws. One must remember that some local regulations presumed valid in a specific region are only photocopies from other regions. This effectively minimizes full social participation, something regulated by the above mentioned Law as well as by the well intended efforts to resolve the social problems within the specific region. In addition, there are also various regulations such as decrees/official letters by Regents and Mayors which are based, for example, on MUI fatwas (religious rulings) or group opinion, and which ignore preexisting laws.
With these standards, efforts of advocacy will focus on the faults and deviations of the regulations without having to take it too high, for example to the constitutional level. The most dangerous aspect of all this is when the government interferes and judges non main stream beliefs. This judgment ends in the banning of the belief/religion/sect as evidenced by the decision made by The Coordinating Agency for Monitoring Religious Sects and Mystical Beliefs, under the coordination of The State Court (MRoRI- WI, No. 6). It violates the rights to expression and freedom of religion and belief.
The following standard concerns local political contexts. If it is indeed proven that local regulations or similar rulings are really only the political commodities of politicians used to attain a specific position, advocacy can be focused on this political commoditization. In South Sulawesi and Cianjur, for example, it has been proven that the “produce” of Syariah Islam (Islamic law) does not significantly impact the chances of a pair being elected as Governor or Regent. These areas known as “maniacs” in relation to Islamic law elected a Governor and vice Governor who hold visions of pluralism and tolerance, but a Regent who does not value such issues.
Occasionally, political issues do become major problems and this demands the courage and vision from those in the central government. But this remains unrealized. Theoretically, decrees/official letters of Regents, Mayors, and Governors which legally speaking are not procedural, for example regulations based on MUI fatwas, and also deviational local regulations, should be revoked by the Minister for Internal Affairs. But because the politics are complex, the government prefers to keep silent, worried about the political reaction which will diminish society’s trust in them. Thus the government needs the courage to take political risks in correcting constitutional deviations (Suaedy, 2006). The Minister for Internal Affairs could have cancelled the implementation of the provincial regulation in Lombok on zakat to allow the salary deductions from civil servants in the name of zakat collection. Unfortunately, the regulation was cancelled only after a huge demonstration and labor strike.
The Strengthening of Political Identity
Once again, the emphasis of the constitution on guaranteeing freedom of religion and belief has been seriously disrupted by the strengthening of religious groups in responding to the development of society and government policies. But in fact, these groups do not do anything to strengthen democracy by eradicating corruption and pushing for transparency. Instead, they strengthen primordialism based on religious grouping and similarity of beliefs. In the era where people can speak freely and the government has no choice but to listen to religious demands, deviation from constitutional and democratic principles is highly possible.
This situation is worsen by the fact that local leaders are inexperienced in managing society’s aspiration in democratic manner. It is not surprising if the government, both regional and central, executive, legislative and judicative, tends to listen to and prioritize the demands of the small number of people who speak loudest and who sometimes resort to intimidation or violence, over giving justice to the large but silent majority. Thus, the increasing influence of these religious groups has provided further obstacles to the implementation of democracy, and the enforcement of the constitution and law.
The strengthening of MUI’s (Indonesian Council of Ulama) role must be given special attention. It is visible in MUI’s ability to loudly voice their views and demands. What makes them stronger than most social organisations is their relationship with the state. MUI was established by Soeharto’s New Order regime. It has, from its establishment, been used as an instrument of the authoritarian government to support its power and handle religious movements against the government. Thus MUI has extensive infrastructure and networking. For instance, it has formal branches throughout Indonesia, in regencies and provinces. It also has informal branches at district level. All branches receive government funding. In addition, MUI also obtains extra funding from its own religious projects outside of government or public control. Examples include the halal labeling of foods and beverages, consultation positions in all the branches of Bank Syari’ah that have syariah (Islamic law) outlets, and specific political projects from the government, such as public education on specific drafts of law regarding religious issues (Suaedy et.al., 2006).
MUI’s membership system is not individual based as with other Islamic social organisations. Thus, any Islamic social organisation which shares the same doctrines and theology as MUI are free to join. As a result, it is almost as if MUI has the prerogative to determine whether an Islamic sect is legal or illegal, whether it is deviant or not, and also the beliefs its members must hold. Ahmadiyah, for example, can not become a member because MUI considers it deviant. Moreover, MUI has urged the government to ban it (MRoRI-WI No. 4). On the other hand, no matter how politically subversive it may be, if MUI deems a group as not deviant, they will be accommodated. The most visible example is Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). HTI’s doctrine states that they are an anti-democratic political organisation, or in religious terminology they ‘meng-haram-kan’ (forbid) democracy. Thus HTI is, from all perspectives, is against the Pancasila and 1945 constitution, and thus against the philosophic and constitutional basis of Indonesia, yet MUI welcomes them. HTI presence even extends throughout MUI, from the very center to the regions (Suaedy et.al., 2006).
This kind of membership system also means that MUI’s products and fatwa (religious decrees) tend to be conservative and in line with radical Islam. This is because there are not so many moderate Islamic organisations, even though those that do exist have enormous membership. In hearings or decision making, each MUI member organisation is given equal representation. So, despite the fact that Muhammadiyah and NU have between 25 to 40 or so million members, each of these organisations are given equal representation to FPI (Islamic Defenders Front), HTI and MMI (Indonesian Mujahadeen Council), all of which are radical and only have hundreds of thousands of members. There are thus very few moderate Islamic organisations in comparison to radical, conservative organisations, which grow like mushrooms during the wet season.
The subsequent result is that any Islamic organisations, including fundamentalist organisations and movements which are against democracy and the Pancasila, can become members of and can be dominant within MUI. The only exception is those groups declared terrorist, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). MUI is thus really a bunker for subversive and fundamentalist organisations and movements in Indonesia. Further, because MUI is funded by the government, these fundamentalist organisations and movements also receive indirect subsidies from the government through MUI. The government is thus helping radical and fundamentalist movements, which are even anti-Pancasila and anti-the 1945 constitution, with capacity building (Suaedy et.al., 2006). In 2005, for example, MUI released a fatwa against pluralism, liberalism and secularism. It was a fatwa that contradicted the existence of the Republic of Indonesia itself and has prompted specific groups to take the law into their own hands through force and violence against those they deem to have deviated from this very MUI fatwa. The fatwa 7/MUNAS VII/MUI/II/2005 states that:
1. Religious Pluralism, Secularism and Liberalism, as referred to in the first section, are ideologies that conflict with Islamic teachings.
2. Muslims are forbidden to embrace Religious Pluralism, Secularism and Liberalism.
The phenomena of the strengthening of MUI’s position and its radical and fundamentalist elements, have drastically increased since Susilo Bambang Yudoyono’s (SBY) presidency. This is because SBY is closer to Islamic political parties which are loyal in their support for him, including the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the Star and Crescent Party (PBB), and the United Development Party (PPP). The secular Democratic Party is the only exception to this, as it is the party SBY established himself; yet it lacks a sufficiently strong intellectual basis. Thus SBY’s presidency is, in practice, largely supported by the above Islamic parties.
SBY’s hidden and open connections to these Islamist parties reveals desires to establish an Islamic state. It can be seen in SBY’s appointment of K.H. Ma’ruf Amin, the head and the most radical and vocal MUI spokesperson on anti-pluralism and anti-freedom of religion and belief, as member of the presidential advisory council in the field of religion. The direction of SBY’s religious policy and perspective, and of religious freedom, is thus quite clear (See Van Zorge, January 29, 2008). There is so much inter-religious prostration and violence, and attacks and violence against groups deemed deviant, that the president can almost never be heard urging the state apparatus to be firmer and more just in dealing with the perpetrators of religious violence, as well as in protecting the victims of prostration and violence. He also cannot be heard expressing his desires for human rights and the constitution and its guarantee of religious freedom to be enforced. On the contrary, the president even opened MUI national work meeting in November 2007 by indicating his explicit support for and agreement with all MUI decisions. In this national work meeting MUI released the fatwa listing the ten criteria for deviant sects to be used as a guide for the Muslim community to independently monitor deviant sects. The consequences have been clear: increasingly uncontrollable inter-religious violence which tends to be destructive and pushes society to take justice into their own hands when it comes to so-considered deviant groups (MRoRI-WI No. 4). This fatwa on the ten criteria for deviance is as follows:
The Ten Guidelines for Monitoring Deviant Religious Sects
1. Disagree with the six Islamic principles of faith;
2. Believe and act differently to what the Qur'an and hadith teach.
3. Believe in decrees that come after the Qur'an.
4. Refuse the authenticity of the Qur'an.
5. Interprete the Qur’an differently from traditional interpretations.
6. Disagree that the hadith is another source of Islamic teaching.
7. Humiliate, despise or look down on prophets and messengers.
8. Do not recognise prophet Muhammad as the last prophet and messenger.
9. Change, add, or remove religious ritual priciples that are determined in syariah, such as "A person can go on the hajj without going to Mecca", and "a person does not have to pray five times a day”.
10. Label other Muslim’s infidel without a syariah-based explanation. For instance, they are infidel just because they do not come from the same Islamic group.
The constitution strongly guarantees citizens, as both individuals and in groups, the right to adhere to a religion and belief, as well as the right to equal and fair protection. But it is clear that in practice quite the contrary occurs. Under SBY’s governance, the state and all its apparatus has been widely involved and discrimatory in issues of the religion and belief of citizens (Van Zorge Report, January 29, 2008).
Collective Violence
Political changes in Indonesia, both the drastic ones of 1965 and 1998 and more gradual ones like the general elections, always have violent elements, to the extent that one researcher labeled Indonesia as a “state of violence” (Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad, 2002). The general elections of the New Order, particularly the 1971 election which was a continuation of the 1965 political configuration, remain undefeated in enormity of their violence. As a result, we need to give attention to times of political formation, such as the current era which is a continuation from the drastic change of 1998.
If we look at the trend so far, inter-communal violence - religious, ethnic and so on – has a increased and government apparatus has been unable to control it. Moreover, religious institutions, especially government affiliated ones, intentionally or not, contribute to the tension and encourage the masses to commit violence. This was the case with the MUI fatwa on deviant sects, and also on Ahmadiyah, and also the case with the Department of Religious Affairs’ insinuations.
UNSFIR’s 2004 report, for example, on “Patterns of Collective Violence in Indonesia 1990-2003” contained shocking data on the amount of collective violence in Indonesia. Collective here refers to violence which occurs between ethnic groups, between adherents of different religions, of between adherents of the same religion but different sects or groups.
These data showed that 89.3% of communal violence resulted in victims, and communal violence accounted for 16.6% of incidents that did not produce victims from all the violence that occurred in Indonesia from 1990-2003. Violence, according to this research, occurred in almost all Indonesian provinces, yet its increase was not uniform over all provinces. Yet it has been collective violence which has always caused the worst destruction and loss to human life and property in comparison to other forms of violence (Ashutosh et.al., pp. 25-27). This does not even include the violence in the Ambon or Moluccas case of Muslims verses Christians, or West Kalimantan case of ethnic Dayaks verses the Madurese.
Over the years from 2004-2006 the Wahid Institute has recorded, as far as can be obtained from the quite restricted mass media, at least 28 cases of violence in several complex forms of collective violence, not only inter-religious but also intra-religious (Suaedy, 2007).
Meanwhile, from 2007 to mid-2008, there have been 58 cases: 18 cases of accusations of deviance; 28 cases of inter- and intra- religious violence; 2 cases of religiously based regulations; and 6 freedom of expression cases protesting against speaking freely to people of specific religions due to religious reasons (Wahid Institute Report, 2008a);
Unavoidable Transformation
The above discussion shows that political change should not stop after the establishment of democratic political institutions, but needs to be accompanied by transformation of thinking. This transformation should also be accompanied by more just social formations and legal reformation that enables the development of a democratic culture. Democratic development now faces horizontal challenges, in comparison to during the New Order era in which it faced vertical challenges from the government and particularly the military.
Various analyses of the obstacles in the way of democracy indicate that the weakness of civil society is the major obstacle. It is weak both in offering more fair social and political formulations as well as in speaking out against deviation from democratic procedures. Such weakness has widespread consequences. For example, the recruitment of politicians who prioritize money politics and accept any means of doing things has resulted in deviation from democratic order and deviation from the ideal objectives of democracy itself (Wahid Institute Report 2008).
Using democracy as justification, those with money and certain primordial group leaders can use what they have to force their desires (often violently) to achieve what they want. They do so not only in cases of religious freedom, but also in almost all important decision making processes. SBY’s indecisiveness has allowed the democratic process to be dominated by destructive elements.
In this perspective, SBY’s presidency has been highly tolerant to what Appleby describes as religious illiteracy—a shallow and ignorant religious understanding which easily resorts to violence at times of sudden change or crisis (Appleby, 2000:69). Continued provocation by the leaders of this religious illiteracy, which SBY’s government has allowed, even met the demands of at times, has been sufficient to spread hatred and violence. As a result, the establishment of religious literacy has been threatened when the leaders of illiterate religions or religious doctrines are questioned critically over their legality in the process of change, while those who want to discuss religious issues and place them in social reality with the aim to find rational solutions are isolated, even threatened.
There is high potential for the growth of social groups, particularly those with links to religious communities, who want to push for more substantial, just and critical social political participation, to be ignored. In fact, lately there have been arrests of civil society groups speaking out against the government. The leader of the Indonesian Awakening Movement (GIB) is a case in point.
The indications and tendencies of the democratic process in Indonesia as seen in the cases of freedom of religion and belief, and the spread of communal violence, would suggest there is still a way to go before democracy is stable. It requires hard work and determination to initiate the process and to smoothly and safely achieve the desired aims.***
Depok, Indonesia, September 12, 2008
*This paper presented at INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM Islam for Social Justice and sustainability:New Perspective on Islams and Pluralism in Indonesia Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), Kyoto University, Kyoto, JAPAN September, 16-17th, 2008.
**The writer is Executive Director the Wahid Institute, Jakarta
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